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Eligibility of Claimants to Commence Derivative Litigation 
THE ELIGIBILITY OF CLAIMANTS TO COMMENCE 
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF CHINA’S 
JOINT STOCK LIMITED COMPANIES 
 Jingchen Zhao and Shuangge Wen 
Derivative actions in modern company law play a crucial role in promoting the efficiency of 
corporate law and the soundness of corporate governance. However, since China’s 
inauguration of derivative action in 2005, now enshrined in s 151 of the Chinese Company 
Law (CCL) 2013 (revised in 2013 and enforced on 1 March 2014), there have been 
complications surrounding the eligibility of shareholder claimants in terms of taking 
derivative action, especially for joint stock limited liability companies (JSLCs). Under art 
151 of the CCL 2013, JSLCs are treated differently from limited liability companies (LLCs). 
Standing requirements are imposed on shareholders in JSLCs, whereas any shareholder has 
the right to sue in LLCs. Shareholders who intend to bring derivative action are required to 
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separately or jointly hold 1 per cent or more of the company’s shares for 180 consecutive 
days. These prescribed thresholds may not only prevent trivial or malicious suits but also 
hinder the effective enforcement of the mechanism. Through doctrinal, comparative and 
empirical analyses of the eligibility of claimants to bring derivative action in JSLCs, the 
article puts forward proposals for how the effectiveness of the regime in China can be 
improved in hope of increasing the effectiveness of the mechanism and the enforcement of 
company law, contributing to the fairness and accountability of corporate governance. It is 
argued that future revision of laws concerning claimants’ eligibility should not only make 
sure that reasonable shareholders are able to use the mechanism but also take into account 
current commercial practices, stock market structures and government policy. 
1. Introduction 
Initially derived from English and US laws, derivative action works as an exception to the 
rule that defines the company itself as the proper person or legal entity to bring action when 
seeking redress against wrongdoers who are in control of the company.1 It is a tool to enable 
                                            
1 The rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 provides a negative answer to the question of whether an 
individual shareholder is able to bring a complaint before the court if an irregularity has been committed in the 
course of a company’s affairs, or if some wrong has been done to the company. This is also the case in China. 
Article 119 of the Civil Procedure Law 2012 in China required the claimant to have direct interest in the 
litigation. Following this, a corporate victim is supposed to sue a wrongdoing director or senior officers. 
However, in a number of cases, this civil procedure rule fails to give remedy for the corporate victim, while it is 
difficult for the legal representatives of the companies or members of the board of directors to bring a lawsuit 
against directors or senior officers. Therefore, it is crucial to enable qualified shareholders to bring derivative 
law suits on behalf of a corporate victim. In common law, the decisions on whether legal proceedings are to be 
instituted or not is the decision of the company’s board of directors according to English law, but the board may 
decide not to commence proceedings on behalf of the company. The legal regime is now codified in the UK 
Companies Act 2006 and was enforced from October 2007 for the purpose of simplifying and modernising the 
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individual shareholders to act in support of the rights and interests of the company. The 
scheme has been seen as a useful tool to both mitigate the dominant power of controlling 
shareholders and curb opportunistic behaviours by the board of directors.2 It provides that if a 
shareholder can establish a case in which the action harming the company constitutes a fraud 
on the company and where the wrongdoers control the company, he will be permitted to take 
proceedings which derive from the company’s right to institute proceedings. Different from 
direct minority protection mechanisms such as unfair prejudice remedies3 or winding ups4 in 
common law countries or their equivalents, the process was designed to protect the company, 
allowing shareholders to bring an action on behalf of the company. Shareholders may benefit 
from successful recoveries since the value of shares will increase pro rota as the assets of the 
company improve in value.5 This protection mechanism has since been inserted in legislation 
in a number of countries with developed markets, such as the United Kingdom, Hong Kong,6 
                                                                                                                                       
old company law to improve its accessibility, since the common law system lacked clarity and was inaccessible. 
Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (London: Stationery Office, Law Com No 246, Cm 3769, 1997) p 7 and para 6.4; see 
also ss 206–264 of the Companies Act 2006. 
2 S Tenev, Chunlin Zhang and Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building 
the Institutions of Modern Markets (Washington, DC: World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, 
2002) p 149. 
3 Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006; O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
4 Sections 122(1)(g) and 124(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986; Re J E Cade & Son Ltd [1991] BCC 360; Re 
Thomas Brinsmead & Sons Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 406; Re Yenidje Tobacco Co [1916] 2 Ch 426. 
5 Z Zhang, “Making the Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits Be Funded?” 
(2008) 38 HKLJ 523, 526. 
6 Sections 731–738 of the New Companies Ordinance 2012 (Cap 622) (the section commenced operation on 3 
March 2014). 
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Australia,7 Canada,8 Japan,9 New Zealand10 and Singapore,11  as well as in countries with 
emerging markets including India,12 Brazil13 and Russia.14 
Following this trend, derivative action was introduced to China, with high 
expectations in art 152 of the Chinese Company Law (CCL) 2005,15 in the form of a short 
provision: 
                                            
7 Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act 2001; see L Thai, “Australian Statutory Derivative Action — Defects, 
Alternative Approaches and Potential for Law Reform” in CB Picker and G Seidman (eds), The Dynamism of 
Civil Procedure — Global Trends and Developments (Heidelberg: Springer, 2016) p 237. 
8 Sections 232 and 242 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act 1985; see also B Cheffins, “Reforming the 
Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects” (1997) 2 Company Financial and 
Insolvency Law Review 227, 234; DH Peterson and MJ Cumming, Shareholder Remedies in Canada (Ontario: 
LexisNexis, 2nd ed., 2009). 
9 Articles 847–848 of the Japanese Company Law 2005; see also H Oda, “Shareholder’s Derivative Action in 
Japan” (2011) 8(3) European Company and Financial Law Review 334. 
10 Sections 165 and 166 of the Companies Act 1993 (New Zealand); see also P Prince, “Australia’s Derivative 
Action: Using the New Zealand Experience” (2000) 18 Company and Securities Law Journal 493; S Watson, 
“A Matter of Balance: The Statutory Derivative Action in New Zealand” (1998) 19 Company Lawyer 236. 
11 Section 216 of the Companies Act 1994 (Singapore) (Cap 50); see P Koh, “The Statutory Derivative Action in 
Singapore: A Critical and Comparative Examination” (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 64; AK Koh, “Excusing 
Notice under Singapore’s Statutory Derivative Action” (2013) 14 Australian Journal of Asian Law 1. 
12 Section 245 of the Companies Act 2013 (India); see also V Khanna and U Varottil, “The Rarity of Derivative 
Action in India: Reasons and Consequences” in DW Puchniak, H Baum and M Ewing-Chow (eds), The 
Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) p 369. 
13 Articles 155 and 157 of the Brazilian Civil Code 2002. 
14 Item 2 of art 71 for Russian Joint Stock Companies 2007. 
15 This legislative amendment came into effect on 1 January 2006. It was originally enshrined into the CCL 
2005 as art 152, and subsequently renumbered as art 151 of the CCL 2013. X Huang, “Shareholders Revolt? 
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“the shareholders in the case of a LLC, or a shareholder that has independently held, 
or the shareholders that have held in aggregate, 1% or more of the shares of the 
company for more than 180 consecutive days in the case of a JSLC, may request in 
writing the board of supervisors, or the supervisors, in the case of a LLC without a 
board of supervisors, to institute proceedings with the people’s court; where the 
supervisors fall under the circumstance set forth in Article 149 hereof, the foregoing 
shareholders may request in writing the board of directors, or the executive directors 
in the case of a LLC without a board of directors, to institute proceedings with the 
people’s court”. 
The provision was renumbered as art 151 but the content was wholly preserved in the 
Company Law 2013 reform, remaining in full force today. 
The mechanism was adopted to address one of six major defects in the Company Law 
of 1993,16 functioning as part of a series of changes surrounding shareholder protection and 
                                                                                                                                       
The Statutory Derivative Action in China” (Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy Research 
Paper 49/2009, 2009) pp 4–6; H Huang, “The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform” (2007) 4(2) Berkeley Business Law Journal 227. 
16 Fourteenth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress Standing Meeting from 25 to 28 of February 
2005 Beijing, for conference discussions on company law see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/44506/44789/index.html; the six defects were summed up by Fan 
and Wang. See J Fan and J Wang, Corporate Law (Beijing: Law Press, 4th ed., 2015) p 59; they were proposed 
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in February 2005 including the registration of 
companies; corporate governance-related issues including the rights and liability of shareholding meetings, 
boards of directors and supervisory boards; the protection of minority shareholders and creditors including a 
more effective derivative action system; issuing, transferring and listing of shares; the supervision of listed 
companies; and fiduciary duties and related liability of board directors and supervisors. 
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shareholders’ rights.17 Notwithstanding the significance of derivative action in modern China, 
the ability and/or eligibility of shareholders to bring derivative action have been largely 
overlooked by scholarly works in this fast-growing nation. Indeed, analyses in the following 
sections reveal that despite the fact that art 151 is a relatively brief and seemingly 
straightforward provision, a detailed examination of its nature, designated scope and relevant 
data from securities markets concerning its practical effects exposes various problems 
hindering its application in joint stock limited liability companies (JSLCs). The article 
focuses on the eligibility issue, by addressing two of these problems, namely the shareholding 
percentage requirement and the shareholding time period requirement. Research on the 
eligibility of claimants in derivative action is significant in terms of maintaining a proper 
balance between affording disgruntled shareholders an effective remedy to seek relief and 
restraining excessive number of shareholders from launching derivative suits against 
companies, which may lead to boards and management being overloaded with unnecessary 
lawsuits and becoming distracted/discouraged from managing the company’s affairs, as well 
as extra workload for the Chinese judicial system. Almost 11 years after the enforcement of 
art 151, the virtually complete lack of reported cases in the field18 suggests that it is time to 
conduct systematic research to revisit the eligibility of claimants in derivative actions in 
Chinese JSLCs, with particular regard to the fast growth of China’s financial markets, the 
increasing diversification of its investors and the now massive group of minority shareholders. 
                                            
17 In detail, two distinct litigation techniques have been introduced for shareholders to vindicate their interests in 
the company on occasions where the directors’ fiduciary duties are breached by key members of the company, 
such as directors, supervisors, senior management executives and sometimes the controlling shareholders. The 
mechanisms include direct suits and derivative suits as shareholder remedies, enabling them to bring legal action 
against the controllers of the company in accordance with ss 151 and 152 of CCL 2013. 
18 Considering the current situation, which is that only one case has been brought against JSLCs, including listed 
companies. 
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The article aims to explore whether the eligibility requirements in art 151 hinder 
minority shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed companies, from initiating a derivative suit. 
The eligibility of shareholder claimants according to art 151 of the CCL 2013 will be 
critically analysed in order to deliver a comprehensive picture of the rationale for different 
treatments of limited liability companies (LLCs) and JSLCs and to determine whether 
shareholders in JSLCs are truly eligible to bring derivative actions in China. After exposing 
the defects in current laws, the article makes suggestions for reforms to the current regime. 
As well as doctrinally clarifying the eligibility of shareholders in terms of raising derivative 
suits and filling the existing legal loopholes, the research is also important from an 
international business perspective, given the increasing number of foreign investors in 
China.19 A legal mechanism providing more effective remedial means for investors will make 
China a more attractive place for investment, in the sense that foreign investors will be 
reassured that their rights will be more substantially protected. 
The study begins with an examination of the company law framework and legislative 
processes in China. Also, it plans to examine what other jurisdictions have sought to do in 
relation to shareholder eligibility to bring derivative actions, in order to find solutions to the 
problems that are encountered by JSLCs in China. This involves comparative analyses of the 
legislations in jurisdictions such as Japan, Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Taiwan, as well as empirical analyses of listed companies in China and their 
top 10 shareholders. The empirical analysis of the publicly available data assists the 
                                            
19 It was reported that China became the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient in the world in 2014; 
see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance (United Nations, 2015) pp 4–5. It was reported that foreign 
firms invested $128bn in China and $86bn in the United States. 
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researchers to work out a more sensible and internationally compatible threshold for 
derivative mechanism which fits Chinese shareholders. 
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, the rationale for 
different treatments of LLC and JSLCs in current CCL and the importance of 
enhancing minority shareholder protection in JSLCs are examined in Section 2, 
based upon which their eligibility issues are discussed in detail. Two interrelated 
issues are addressed to explore why JSLCs are treated differently in derivative 
action — on one hand, the mechanism threshold which avoids malicious litigation 
considering the number of shareholders in JSLCs in China, and on the other hand, 
the significance of Chinese reform for more user-friendly shareholder remedy 
mechanisms in JSLCs. Section 3 moves on to assess whether the shareholding 
percentage threshold requirement for JSLCs embedded in art 151 of CCL 2013 is 
appropriate, enforceable and effective. In Section 4, the validity and effectiveness of 
the shareholding period threshold requirement for JSLCs, also embedded in art 151 
of the CCL 2013, is considered. Section 5 goes on to present legislative experience 
from other jurisdictions, in hope of clarifying and promoting the necessity of 
reconsidering the issue in JSLCs in China. Finally, there are some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Rationale for Enquiries about the Quantity of Derivative 
Suits and Justification of Different Treatments for LLCs 
and JSLCs 
Article 151 of the CCL 2013 provides a threshold requirement concerning the size of the 
shareholding and the period for which it must be held, but it only operates in relation to 
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shareholders in JSLCs who wish to bring derivative actions, not to their counterparts in LLCs. 
Before discussing the threshold requirement in detail, it is important to analyse the rationale 
for offering different treatments to minority shareholders in JSLCs and LLCs in terms of 
bringing a derivative action. In addition, the reasons why the protection of shareholders in 
JSLCs is becoming increasingly significant will be investigated in the context of the 
transformation of Chinese corporate governance and the Chinese economy. 
(a) Enquiries about the Status Quo 
Research concerning derivative action in China thus far can be roughly divided into two 
groups; before the 2006 legislative reform, research mainly focused on the rationality of 
transplanting a derivative action mechanism to the Chinese context and the preliminary 
construction of this regime. After the promulgation of the CCL 2005, the literature, based 
upon discussions of reported cases, tended to focus on the interpretation of the legislative 
wording and the functions of the regime.20 One presumption behind most research was that 
shareholders, including minority shareholders, Chinese shareholders, would not hesitate in 
opting to use derivative action if they feel mistreated. However, even a cursory look at 
relevant legal practices would cast doubt on this presumption. As reported by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) 2014 annual report, only 163 cases were closed, 
and 158 decisions were made to impose sanctions involving fines and disgorgement orders 
due to the misconduct of directors in listed companies in 2014. These included 36 disclosure 
violation cases, 69 insider trading cases and 15 market manipulation cases. A total of 86 and 
                                            
20  For example, “shareholders that have held in aggregate” has been interpreted by M Hu and P Zhang, 
“Research on Legal Application of Derivative Action in China (股东代表诉讼的法律适用研究)” (2007) 
People’s Judicature人民司法 79; on the function of the mechanism see X Mi, “Analysis of Some Important 
Measures to Protect Minority Shareholders” Rights & Benefits In The New ‘Corporation Law’ 评新《公司法
》对小股东权益保护的几项重要举措” (2006) Law Science Magazine 法学杂志 72. 
10 
 
77 cases were concluded in 2013 and 2012, respectively.21 In detail, these cases were due to 
various reasons including a breach of duties owed by the directors, supervisors and senior 
managers because of the violation of laws, administrative regulations or the articles of 
association, losses caused to the company and the controlling shareholder or actual 
controlling parties using their dominant position to control the company’s assets and harm the 
interests of the company. Most of these cases could have easily become reasons for minority 
shareholders to bring lawsuits on behalf of the company. However, shareholders in JSLCs in 
China are not currently using derivative action as a mechanism, even though it is a system 
used in public companies in many other jurisdictions.22  In other words, there is a great 
untapped potential for derivative action to be used by shareholders in JSLCs. 
The limited use of derivative action seems to be particularly acute in JSLCs.23 Cases 
in which shareholder(s) have brought derivative actions on behalf of companies have been 
reported in the Chinalawinfo (Bei Da Fa Bao) search engine since the enforcement of the 
Company Law 2005.24 Purely judging from the number of cases identified by Huang, we 
                                            
21 CSRC, 2014 Annual Report, p 31. 
22 See Section 5 of this article. 
23 In CCL, the LLC and the JSLC are the functional equivalents of a private company and a public company 
under English law; see J Wang, Company Law in China: Regulation of Business Organizations in a Socialist 
Market Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014) pp 50–51; see also M Gu, Understanding Chinese 
Company Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006) pp 22–23. 
24 “Chinalawinfo” was launched by the Legal Information Centre of Peking University and Peking University 
IAC Technology Co, Ltd jointly as a one-stop intelligent legal information retrieval platform: see 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/ (Chinese version of the website) and http://www.lawinfochina.com/ (English version of 
the website). 
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agree that the derivative action mechanism has had a noticeable impact in China.25 However, 
an in-depth investigation of the corporate contexts in which the actions occurred suggests 
otherwise. The claimants in these reported cases are shareholders in LLCs only. Since the 
implementation of art 151, there has only been one lawsuit brought by shareholders of JSLCs 
(unreported in Bei Da Fa Bao), which was subsequently accepted by the Shandong Higher 
People’s Court on 11 December 2009,26 implying that shareholders in JSLCs were either 
extremely reluctant or encountered significant difficulties in bringing cases of litigation on 
behalf of their companies. As will be discussed, the latter seems to be the major reason: at the 
current time the derivative action legal mechanism functions as no more than window 
dressing or “a big disappointment”27 for shareholders in JSLCs in China. 
(b) Treating LLCs and JSLCs Differently 
Article 2 of the CCL 2013 provides that “the term ‘companies’ refers to LLCs and companies 
limited by shares established within the territory of China pursuant to the Law (namely 
JSLCs)”.28 Regarding the investment of shareholders in China, a shareholder in an LLC can 
limit his liability to the equitable capital contribution, whereas the liability of the shareholder 
in a JSLC is limited to the full payment of shares for which he subscribed.29 Despite the fact 
that LLCs are not exclusively small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the LLC form is 
                                            
25 H Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 644. 
26 The case involves an attempt by the plaintiffs, 78 shareholders of Sanlian Shangshe（三联商社）, to bring a 
derivative claim against the former controlling shareholder. 
27 Huang (n 25 above) p 644. 
28 Equivalent of private and public companies. 
29 Article 3 of the CCL 2013. 
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most attractive for SMEs in China.30 Compared to LLCs, JSLCs are characterised by more 
dispersed ownership and larger sizes. There are four main differences between JSLCs and 
LLCs in China. 
First, traditionally speaking, many listed companies within the scope of JSLCs in 
China still constitute “listed state-involved enterprises (SIEs)”, and the largest shareholder 
normally is the state, which dominates the shareholding in listed companies. It is reported that 
an average of 31.27 per cent of the shares in these companies are held by the government.31 
This ownership by the state may suggest concentrated shareholding as a characteristic of 
Chinese corporate governance in terms of shareholding structure, due to the dominance of 
state shares in China. However, a detailed investigation into the share ownership composition 
of listed companies would suggest diversity rather than concentration: individual and non-
state institutional shareholders have increased dramatically in the last 10 years with 91 
million gu min (the shareholder population) in July 2015, and an incredible 80 per cent of 
urban Chinese households which are or were formerly investors in the equity market.32 The 
                                            
30 RC Art and M Gu, “China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
(1995) 20 Yale Journal of International Law 273, 292. It is claimed that China only had 10,000 joint-stock 
companies and 2,800 listed companies among 77,469,000 registered companies up to January 2016; see China 
Industry and Commerce News, “Access Environment Continues to Improve with Stable Competitive 
Environment and Well-Maintained Consumer Environment” China Industry and Commerce News (14 January 
2015), available at http://www.cicn.com.cn/zggsb/2016-01/14/cms81467article.shtml (last visited on 6th June 
2018) 
31 Y Thanatawee, “Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from China” (2014) 6 International 
Journal of Economics and Finance 197, 199, quoted by OECD, OECD Survey of Corporate Governance 
Frameworks in Asia (2017). 
32 See the report of CSDC, available at http://www.chinaclear.cn/english/en_index.shtml (last visited on 6th 
June 2018). 
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dispersed share ownership makes it sensible to introduce eligibility provisions for JSLCs with 
the purpose of preventing boards of directors or the courts from being overloaded with 
lawsuits. Comparatively, LLCs must be invested in and established by no more than 50 
shareholders. 33  Shareholders in LLCs are thus more likely to have a substantial share 
ownership percentage. Indeed, an investigation reveals that fellow shareholders in Chinese 
LLCs are usually family members, relatives, colleagues or close friends.34 Shareholders in 
LLCs need compelling reasons to break these close ties and enforce their rights to bring a 
derivative action, considering the close guanxi 35  (either family guanxi or friend guanxi) 
between shareholders and directors in LLCs. 
Second, despite the fact that shareholders in JSLCs do enjoy freedom in terms of 
buying and selling shares, it is still important and necessary for them to have comprehensive 
and accessible remedies. It is clear that dissatisfied shareholders in JSLCs could very easily 
leave the company by selling their shares on the stock markets, whereas there is no liquid 
market for potential share transactions in LLCs. The disadvantaged position of shareholders 
                                            
33 Article 25 of the CCL 2013. 
34 J Liu, “Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to 
Make the Hybrid of Civil Law and Common Law Work?” (2015) European Business Law Review 107, 118–
119; see also SS Tang, “Corporate Avengers Need Not Be Angels: Rethinking Good Faith in the Derivative 
Action” (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 471. 
35 Guanxi means close relationship in Chinese. It is, in essence, a coalition-based network of stakeholders 
sharing resources for survival, and it plays an important role in achieving business success in China. See JH Pac 
and YH Wong, “A Model of Close Business Relationship in China (Guanxi)” (2001) 35 European Journal of 
Marketing 51; S Ruehle, “Guanxi as Competitive Advantages during Economic Crises: Evidence from China 
during the Recent Global Financial Crisis” in X Fu (ed), China’s Role in Global Economic Recovery 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) p 64; J Dunning and C Kim, “The Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory 
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in LLCs is exacerbated by the legal requirement imposing a legal restriction on equity 
transfers in LLCs. A member must obtain the consent of at least half the other shareholders 
prior to the member selling their shares.36 Therefore, the tie between the shareholders and 
company in LLCs seems to be stronger, and it is less likely that shareholders will abuse the 
system and want to buy shares for the purpose of bringing a derivative action or using them 
to put pressure on board members in the interests of shareholders. 
Third, although JSLCs are subject to more demanding reporting requirements, 
including promoter’s agreements, minutes of general meetings, minutes of the meetings of 
the board of directors, minutes of the meetings of the board of supervisors, financial and 
accounting reports 37  and the information disclosure requirements embedded within the 
corporate governance code for listed companies, information asymmetry problems between 
minority shareholders and corporate controllers, either as the result of shareholders’ limited 
access to information or their ignorance and/or lack of understanding of the available 
information, are still a significant issue in JSLCs. This places minority shareholders in a 
disadvantaged position in terms of triggering derivative action.38 In terms of derivative action, 
shareholders are required to gather facts in order to evaluate whether an action should be 
commenced or to assess the strength of any potential action.39 Therefore, information is an 
important precondition and incentive for successful litigation. Minority shareholders may not 
                                                                                                                                       
Study” (2007) The World Economy 329, 333; K Xin and J Pearce, “Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for 
Formal Institutional Support” (1996) 39 Academy of Management Journal 1641. 
36 CCL 2013 art 72. 
37 Ibid., arts 90, 96 and 97. 
38 J Oliver, W Qu and V Wise, “Corporate Governance: A Discussion on Minority Shareholder Protection in 
China” (2014) 6 International Journal of Economics and Finance 11. 
39  L Field, M Lowry and S Shu, “Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?” (2005) 39 Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 487. 
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have effective access to the information; they are likely to be limited to the information 
already available to the public. This may be another reason why a more functional and 
effective shareholder remedy system should be promoted in China for JSLCs including listed 
ones. More effective and user-friendly mechanisms for derivative action will facilitate 
information exchanges between shareholders who are willing to bring litigation together and 
will encourage those shareholders who “lose hope” in derivative actions in terms of acquiring 
knowledge about the companies and becoming more concerned about the performance of the 
companies in a positive manner. 
Finally, different requirements for derivative actions in LLCs and JSLCs mitigate 
different problems stemming from various modes of ownership and control. In non-state-
controlled enterprises, ownership and control are becoming separated with the purpose of 
transformation from an administrative and planned economy to a more market-oriented 
economy — professional directors are appointed for corporations just as they are in countries 
with industrialised and developed markets, such as the United States or the United 
Kingdom, 40  where there has been encouragement of a more scattered and diversified 
shareholding structure and hence the legal systems have fostered better protection of minority 
shareholders.41 In order to promote the corporate governance of JSLCs that are non-state-
controlled, effective shareholders’ remedies in these companies, as one of the critical fairness 
goals for corporate governance, are key for the transformation of the economic model in 
China from a planned to a market economy, including the transformation of corporate 
                                            
40 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan 
Corporation, 1932). 
41 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Sheifer and R Vishny, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106 The Journal of 
Political Economy 1113. 
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governance from an administratively oriented model to a more economic-oriented one as 
desired by the Chinese government. 
In state-controlled enterprises, the boards of directors, many of whom are Bureau of 
State Asset Management officers, are trying to maximise the interests of the state, who is the 
biggest shareholder. They are civil servants employed by the government, whose 
remunerations are decided by the government and their administrative ranking, rather than 
relating to the performance of the corporations they manage. These directors will “align their 
interests with the local government, whose political interests may be to preserve employment 
rather than increase the efficiency of the listed (companies)”.42 These non-economic concerns 
could lead to the trend of diverting the company’s profits or assets which may harm the 
economic interests of the company, and for that matter, the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Many listed companies, especially state-controlled ones, do accommodate 
objectives other than profit maximisation, most commonly, public welfare goals. Apart from 
making profits, such corporations have other more immediate administrative missions such as 
the maintenance of urban employment, other social and environmental purposes or various 
administrative tasks required by the CSRC in order to regulate China’s stock market. 
Administrative interference aims to serve the state’s interests and strategic plans by 
controlling or influencing multifarious issues of business operation.43  The administrative 
approach stems from the government policy in maintaining a full or controlling ownership in 
                                            
42 LH Tan and JY Wang, “Modelling an Efficient Corporate Governance System for China’s Listed State-
Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy” (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 143, 149. 
43 HX Wu, “Accounting for the Sources of Growth in Chinese Industry 1980-2010” in L Song, R Garnaut and C 
Fang (eds), Depending Reform for China’s Long-Term Growth and Development (Canberra: The Australia 
National University Press, 2014) pp 431, 432–433. 
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corporations so as to achieve direct control of key industries such as energy, banking and 
telecommunications.44 Furthermore, it may entail direct involvement in upstream industries 
due to their strategic importance in sustaining the growth of downstream industries. 
Different corporate forms understandably entail different agency costs. As argued by 
Lin, two kinds of agency costs are particularly acute in China, namely vertical agency costs 
between shareholders and managers, and horizontal agency costs between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders due to the vulnerability of minority shareholders and 
the exploration of blockers; the latter is common in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership 
jurisdictions, particularly those with widespread SIEs.45 Generally speaking, the incentive for 
SIEs to maximise the interests of other non-state shareholders could be less distinct and relies 
more on managers taking autonomous executive actions. Inversely, effective protection 
means offered to minority shareholders in state-controlled JSLCs would serve the dual 
purpose of mitigating the conflicts of interest between shareholders and boards of directors 
and between majority shareholders (ie, the state) and minority shareholders.46 They might be 
particularly helpful to those who invest in state-controlled JSLCs but have been mistreated in 
the process of corporations pursuing administrative goals set by the government. 
In stark contrast, in LLCs, ownership is only marginally separated from control. 
These kinds of companies typically have an ownership structure comprising several 
                                            
44 Q Liu and Z Lu, “Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A 
Tunnelling Perspective” (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 881, 884; see also LSO Wanderley, R Lucian, 
F Farache and JM de Sousa Filho, “CSR Information Disclosure on the Web: A Context-Based Approach 
Analysing the Influence of Country of Origin and Industry Sector” (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 369. 
45 S Lin, “Double Agency Costs in China: A Legal Perspective” (2012) 9 The Asian Business Lawyer 116, 129. 
46 A Shleifer and RW Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737. 
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significant shareholders.47 Instead of various information disclosure requirements, a dialogue 
mechanism is normally established between the board of directors and the shareholders 
owing to their close ties. 48  This dialogue will be comparatively easier with limited 
shareholder requirements and the overlap between shareholders and board members. In most 
circumstances, the board seats in an LLC are directly occupied by shareholders themselves. 
Therefore, it can be shown that LLCs and JSLCs are treated differently in China due 
to their different shareholding structures, different levels of separation of ownership and 
control, different levels of information disclosure requirements, their shareholder volume and 
their different practices for issuing shares. The variations in the treatment of LLCs and JSLCs 
are necessary to avoid both malicious litigation and increasing the workloads of boards of 
directors, supervisor and the courts. Furthermore, a balance should be maintained between 
giving boards discretion to manage companies in the way that they consider will promote the 
success of the company and monitoring mechanisms and intervention in any proceedings 
from shareholders to which the company is a party at an appropriate level. 
(c) Importance of Effective Derivative Action as a Tool to Protect Companies’ Interests for 
Shareholders in JSLCs 
                                            
47 A Gomes and W Novaes, “Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance” (Unpublished working 
paper, Philadelphia, PA: The Wharton School, 1999); see also N Attig, SE Ghoul and O Guedhami, “Do 
Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role? Evidence from East Asia” (2009) 32 The 
Journal of Financial Research 395. 
48 It is also suggested by the European Confederation of Directors’ Association Corporate Governance guidance 
and Principles for Unlisted Companies in European 2015 Principle 7 that: 
“There should be a dialogue between the board and the shareholders based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives. The board should as a whole have responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue 
with shareholders take place.” 
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Derivative action is a critical mechanism, operating in the interests of companies and their 
shareholders to promote corporate governance goals such as fairness, accountability and 
effectiveness. After all, one issue that all corporate governance mechanisms attempt to 
address is opportunistic and abusive corporate behaviours by controllers of a company.49 It is 
expected that improved shareholder remedy schemes will also promote the sustainable 
development of the capital market. It is positive to see that a number of mechanisms have 
been introduced in China for shareholder protection purposes, such as cumulative voting 
systems,50 guidelines51 and notifications.52 However, there is still room to improve minority 
shareholder protection. The World Bank Doing Business Index provides objective measures 
of business regulations for local firms in 189 economies and selected cities at the sub-national 
level, and rankings are issued annually, with “protecting minority investors” included as 1 of 
11 sets of indicators; whether shareholders can sue derivatively is a key question (with 
follow-up questions) for the assessment of this indicator. Based on the 2017 report, China 
                                            
49 Tang (n 34 above) p 473. 
50 Article 105 of the CCL 2013; see also Y Chen and J Du, “Regulatory Reform of Cumulative Voting in 
Corporate China: Who Were Elected and Its Impact” (Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference, 
28 January 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2556157 (last visited on 6th 
June 2018); see also C Xi and Y Chen, “Does Cumulative Voting Matter? The Case of China: An Empirical 
Assessment” (2014) 15 European Business Organization Law Review 585. 
51 For example, the modification of the “Rules for General Meetings of Shareholders of Listed Companies and 
Guidelines on the Articles of Association of Listed Companies” which is expected to improve disclosure 
requirements and voting information for minority shareholders. 
52 In 2014, CSRC and the People’s Bank of China jointly released the Rules for Bonds Statistics and issued a 
notification of the Hirisun Case, where we also witnessed the first case to require majority shareholders to 
compensate minority shareholders for their losses caused by the misrepresentation of listed companies. This 
proved to be an effective way for shareholders to seek remedies and a rewarding attempt at building up a 
compensation mechanism for minority shareholders in listed companies. 
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ranks 123rd in this indicator, in comparison with a position of 78th in the general ranking.53 
The indicator related to minority shareholder protection is noticeably weaker compared with 
other indicators evaluating how easy and safe it is to “do business” in China. 
A number of studies have been addressing the improvement of corporate governance 
in response to troublesome practices in China, with many suggestions and recommendations 
to improve various values of corporate governance; 54  the protection of shareholders, 
including effective remedies for minority shareholders, has been a particularly important 
aspect.55 Based on the empirical report by Protiviti/China and the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, the “conflict of interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders 
remains a major issue in the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies”, regarded as 
one of the important risk indicators. 56  Other things China currently lacks include “a 
comprehensive set of legal rules that provide protection for outside investors” and “the ability 
                                            
53  World Bank Group, Doing Business 2017: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency (14th ed., 
Washington: World Bank, 2017). 
54  For example, see Q Liu, “Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and 
Institutional Determinants” (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 415; Tan and Wang (n 42 above); Y Gao, 
“Corporate Social Performance in China: Evidence from Large Companies” (2009) 89 Journal of Business 
Ethics 23; HWC Yeung, Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards a Hybrid Model (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2004); KLA Lau and A Young, “Why China Shall Not Completely Transit from a Relation Based to a Rule 
Based Governance Regime: A Chinese Perspective” (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
577. R Mead, International Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); R Morck and 
B Yeung, “Corporate Governance in China” (2014) 26 Journal of Corporate Finance 20; J Yang, J Chi and M 
Young, “A Review of Corporate Governance in China” (2011) 25 Asian Pacific Economic Literature 15. 
55 R Tomasic and N Andrews, “Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top 100 Listed Companies” (2007) 
9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 88, 110. 
56  Protiviti/China and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Corporate Governance Assessment Summary 
Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012 (2013) p. 9. 
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to implement effectively the existing laws that govern the operations of corporations and the 
securities market”, 57  both hindering the provision of better remedies for shareholders in 
China. An effective derivative action mechanism for JSLCs in China is thus crucial for 
enhancing shareholder value, cultivating the soundness of corporate governance, restoring the 
confidence of domestic and international investors and establishing the sustainable 
development of capital markets in China.58 
On a broad spectrum, the importance of derivative action is further evidenced in light 
of the rapid development of the stock market in China. Chinese stock exchange markets, 
including the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, have grown to become the largest in 
Asia and the second largest globally, with 3,512 listed free-floating market capitalisations 
reaching a value of RMB 561.26 trillion by 30 January 2017.59 A key characteristic of the 
Chinese capital markets60 has been the extremely high percentage of small investors holding 
                                            
57 T Kato and C Long, “CEO Turnover, Firm Performance, and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from 
Micro Data” (2006) 34 Journal of Comparative Economics 796, 798; see also F Allen, J Qian and M Qian, 
“Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China” (2005) 77 Journal of Financial Economics 57; F Jiang and KA 
Kim, “Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective” (2015) 32 Journal of Corporate Finance 190; K 
Pistor and C Xu, “Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China” (2005) 7 American 
Law and Economic Review 184; Liu (n 54 above); H Zou, S Wong, C Shum, J Xiong and J Yan, “Controlling-
Minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from 
China” (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 2636. 
58 Liu (n 34 above) p 117; DC Clarke, “Corporate Governance in China: An Overview” (2003) 14 China 
Economic Review 494, 502–503; S Lin and D Cabrelli, “Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders in China” 
(2013) 8 Frontiers of Law in China 266. 
59 CSRC data February 2018; available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/sjtj/ (last visited on 6th June 
2018). 
60 Analysis surrounding the high percentage of small investors was based on a 2008 Report issued by the CSRC, 
which has not provided any updated reports since that date. 
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less than RMB 1 million (approximately 0.13 million Euro) in cash or share equivalent, 
accounting for 98.8 and 99.3 per cent of the total number of share capital in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respectively.61 With a large number of individual shareholders, 
the average turnover rate is understandably high, reaching 201.3 in 2013 and 240.3 in 2014.62 
In the light of the booming capital market, with a daily turnover of more than RMB 1.25 
trillion and a trading volume of 1,296 million corporate clients and 3,715 million individual 
clients,63 packed with poorly informed and unsophisticated individual investors, the problems 
of inadequate shareholder protection are becoming increasingly acute for Chinese 
regulators.64 The rapid growth of the Chinese stock markets does require a more effective and 
rigorously monitored shareholder remedies mechanism that is fit for purpose in the growing 
financial market and for effective supervision by market participants. 
Corporate governance-wise, derivative action has been introduced to China as a 
supplementary means of restricting corporate behaviour and the power of boards of directors. 
Indeed, during the Company Law 2005 legislation process, the professionalism and 
competitiveness of the directors on the boards were severely questioned. In the eyes of the 
legislators, derivative action as a potentially functional shareholder remedy to enforce 
directors’ duties65  would serve the purpose of enhancing corporate transparency and the 
accountability of boards of directors, so as to benefit companies and their shareholders in 
                                            
61 China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Markets Development Report (2008) pp 269–270. 
62  The World Bank, Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%), data available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR (last visited on 6th June 2018). 
63 2014 Annual Report (n 21 above) pp 14, 21. 
64 Huang (n 15 above) p 5. 
65 FX Hong, “Director Regulation in China: The Sinonization Process” (2011) 19 Michigan State Journal of 
International Law 502, 536–542; R Lee, “Fiduciary Duty without Equity: ‘Fiduciary Duties’ of Directors under 
the Revised Company Law of the PRC” (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 897. 
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general. 66  Using derivative action as a legal tool may be employed as a remedy of 
compensation, whereas successful lawsuits may confer monetary benefits to the company and 
impose financial penalties on wrongdoers.67 On the basis of the above-stated concerns, the 
derivative action regime was introduced as a mechanism complementary to other structural as 
well as internal and external corporate governance devices, to better enforce directors’ duties, 
ensure that directors pay attention to their legal duties68 and to achieve fairness in corporate 
governance between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As described by 
Huang, the adoption of this mechanism was “a major development in Chinese company 
legislation” which was expected to have “far-reaching implications for corporate governance” 
in China.69 These implications might be said to include additional enhancement of minority 
                                            
66 L Chun, The Governance Structure of Chinese Firms (Heidelberg and London: Springer, 2009); Yang et al (n 
54 above); N Rajagopalan and Y Zhang, “Corporate Governance Reform in China and India: Challenges and 
Opportunities” (2008) 51 Business Horizons 55; Y Cheung, P Jiang, P Limpaphayom and T Lu, “Does 
Corporate Governance Matter in China” (2008) 19 China Economic Review 460; H Sami, J Wang and H Zhou, 
“Corporate Governance and Operating Performance of Chinese Listed Firms” (2011) 20 Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 106; L Miles and Z Zhang, “Improving Corporate Governance 
in State-Owned Corporations in China: Which Way Forward?” (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 213; 
S Li, “China’s (Painful) Transition from Relation-Based to Rule-Based Governance: When and How, Not If and 
Why” (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 567; G Xu, T Zhou, B Zeng and J Shi, 
“Directors’ Duties in China” (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 57. 
67 R Kraakman, H Park and S Shavell, “When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interest?” (1994) 82 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 1773 (Discussion Paper No 133 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138, 1993). 
68  A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) pp 45, 52; see also A Keay, “The Ultimate Objective of the Company and the 
Enforcement of the Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model” (2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
35, 40–45; J Zhao, “A More Efficient Derivative Action System in China: Challenges and Opportunities 
through Corporate Governance Theory” (2013) 64 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 233. 
69 Huang (n 15 above) p 242. 
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shareholder protection, the provision of effective means against wrongdoing managing 
officers and directors of companies, 70  and the resolution of power imbalances between 
directors and shareholders and between minority and majority shareholders, to name but a 
few. 
3. Shareholding Percentage Requirement 
After discussing the significance of a well-designed eligibility threshold, this section goes on 
to examine a few doctrinal deficiencies in terms of shareholders’ eligibility to bring a 
derivative action in the CCL, with a particular focus on the shareholding percentage 
requirement in JSLCs. 
(a) Rational and Legislative Experiences for Imposing a Percentage Requirement 
Shareholding percentage is not required as one of the elements qualifying shareholders to 
bring a derivative action in public companies in common law countries.71 This is probably 
because of the case law-based tradition of common law countries, which allows more 
flexibility in law-making and judicial control, to avoid abuse of the derivative action 
mechanism. For instance, in the UK Companies Act 2006, court permission is required before 
a claim brought by a shareholder can even continue as a derivative claim, upon proving the 
existence of a prima facie case.72 In the United States, taking the most influential Delaware 
corporate law practice as an example, a two-step test was established in the Supreme Court 
                                            
70 JV Feinerman, “New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?” (2007) 191 The China Quarterly 590, 605. 
71 For the UK law, see ss 260–263 of the Companies Act 2006. The United Kingdom makes no distinction 
between private and public companies in this regard. 
72 Section 261(2) of the UK Companies Act 2006; see also Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2011] 1 BCLC 498; 
Abouraya v Sigmund [2014] EWHC 277. 
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case of Zapata Corp v Maldonado 73  in reviewing the decision of the special litigation 
committee: first, the court “must inquire into the independence and good faith of the 
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions”, and a company “should have the burden 
of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation”. Judicial control in 
common law countries purportedly restrains potential abusive usages of the derivative action 
mechanism, whereas civil law countries with a great respect for legislation would normally 
use ex ante procedural safeguards to achieve the same purpose, shareholding percentage 
requirement being a typical example.74 
In Germany, the current law allows one or more persons holding shares constituting at 
least 1 per cent of the company’s capital, or having a nominal value of at least 100,000 Euro, 
to file a derivative action in companies limited by shares.75 South Korean law stipulates that 
the shareholding threshold for filing a derivative suit is 0.01 per cent in the case of listed 
companies.76 As for non-listed companies, any shareholder who holds not less than one per 
cent of the total outstanding shares may demand that the company file an action against the 
directors to enforce their liability.77  In Taiwan, the derivative action mechanism is only 
available to companies limited by shares, and any shareholder(s) who hold(s) three per cent 
or more of the shares may request the supervisors of the company to institute an action 
against a director(s).78 This threshold is widely criticised by scholars as unnecessarily high 
                                            
73 430 A 2d 779, 788 (Delaware 1981). 
74 A Cahn and DC Donald, Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Law Governing Corporations in 
Germany, the UK and the USA (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010) p 602. 
75 Section 148(1) of the AktG 1965. 
76 Sections 191–13(1) of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act 1962 (amended in 1976 and 2002). 
77 Article 403 of the Commercial Act (Republic of Korea) 1963. 
78 Article 214 of the Companies Act (Taiwan) 2009; LY Liu, “The Derivative Action” (2004) 64 Taiwan Law 
Journal 156. 
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and pragmatically prejudicial against minority shareholders who wish to bring a derivative 
action.79 Japan is one of the first countries in the civil law group not to have a quantitative 
shareholding requirement.80 Empirical research demonstrated that 119 derivative actions were 
brought in listed companies in Japan during the period from 1993 to 2009, significantly more 
than the number of law suits in China.81 
(b) Identifying the Differences in Application of Derivative Action between LLCs and 
JSLCs 
In light of the requirements, reforms and criticisms in other jurisdictions, the one per cent 
shareholding threshold requirements enshrined in art 151 of the CCL 2013 seemingly 
                                            
79 WR Tseng and WWY Wang, “Derivative Actions in Taiwan: Legal and Cultural Hurdles with A Glimmer of 
Hope for the Future” in D Puchniak, H Baum and M Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p 215; Liu, Ibid.; H 
Wang, “The Derivative Action in Taiwan Company Law and Reform Suggestions 公司法中的代表诉讼制度的
缺失与改进之道” in L, Liu (ed), Commercial Monographs — Professor Lai Fiftieth Birthday Congratulations 
Proceedings 商法专论- 赖英映照教授五十岁生日祝贺论文集 (Taipei: Yuanzhao Publishing, 1995) p 130. 
80 Section 847(1) and 847(2) of the Companies Act (Japan) 2005 replaced s 267(1) with the old Japanese 
Commercial Code. Both sections allow any shareholder who held at least one share continuously for six months 
to demand a corporation act to enforce a directors’ duties; MM Siems, “Private Enforcement of Directors’ 
Duties: Derivative Action as a Global Phenomenon” in S Wrbka, S Van Uytsel and M Siems (eds), Collective 
Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
2012) p 93. 
81  M Nakahigashi and DW Punchniak, “Land of the Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting Irrationality to 
Understand Japan’s Unreluctant Shareholder Litigate” in DW Puchniak, H Baum and M Ewing-Chow (eds), 
The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) pp 128, 172–173. Other than the absence of a shareholding requirement, this may also be due to a 
number of other factors, of which low and fixed litigation costs are important. See MD West, “Why 
Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan” (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 351; Zhang (n 5 above). 
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constitute a barrier hindering the vast majority of shareholders, including individual and 
institutional shareholders, in JSLCs who wish to bring derivative actions as an effective 
remedy, proved by the drastic differences between derivative action cases in LLCs and JSLCs. 
We used the most authoritative legal search engine in China, Bei Da Fa Bao, and found that 
since the implementation of the CCL 2005, 126 cases have been accepted by the People’s 
Court in which shareholder(s) brought derivative actions either individually or collectively.82 
The number of derivative action cases in LLCs in China is notably higher, or at least not 
considerably lower, than the number of derivative action cases in other jurisdictions.83 In the 
meantime, the Sanlian Shangshe case in 2009 was the only case involving a shareholder in a 
JSLC bringing a derivative action. The question arises, therefore, why the mechanism has 
                                            
82 This includes 13 cases in 2006, 6 cases in 2007, 17 cases in 2008, 22 cases in 2009, 22 cases in 2010, 14 cases 
in 2011, 8 cases in 2012, 3 cases in 2013, 8 cases in 2014 and 13 cases in 2015. 
83 Based on the research of Professor Keay, since the enforcement of s 260 of the Companies Act 2006 on 1 
October 2007, the regime of derivative action has not been used (data from a search of the Westlaw, Lexis and 
BAILII databases for three jurisdictions, namely England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). 22 
derivative actions were instituted up to September 2015. After September 2015, there is one reported case in the 
period till June 2016: Brannigan v Style [2016] EWHC 512 (CH). Therefore, 23 derivative actions have been 
instituted up to June 2016. However, the popularity and effectiveness of the derivative action mechanism are 
decided by many factors. Obviously, unfair prejudice, based on s 994 of the Companies Act 2006, has proved to 
be a very popular mechanism in minority shareholder remedies and is argued to be a comprehensive barrier to 
instituting a derivative claim; see A Keay, “Assessing and Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative 
Actions under the Companies Act 2006” (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39, 41 and 59–67. In 
Japan, according to Nakahigashi and Punchniak, 29 derivative actions were brought from 1993 to 2009 for 
unlisted companies; Nakahigashi and Punchniak (n 81 above) pp 172–173; 27 cases were bought on behalf of 
private companies among 31 cases from 2000 to 2005 according to Ramsay and Saunders; see IM Ramsay and 
BB Saunders, “Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An Empirical Study of the Australian Statutory 
Derivative Action” (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 397, 420. 
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been scarcely used in JSLCs in China, considering that shareholders in LLCs in China seek to 
use the mechanism much more often. 
In a logical manner, doubts have been thrown on the threshold applicable to JSLCs. 
For example, the percentage requirement prescribed in CCL has been heavily criticised by 
scholars thus far. The following sections contribute to this matter by way of an empirical 
analysis, and feasible alternatives are suggested as a result.84 
(c) Data from the Chinese Stock Market and Practical Difficulties in Meeting the One Per 
cent Threshold 
One should review the statistics in relation to the general scale and percentage of 
shareholding in China before commenting on whether the current one per cent shareholding 
percentage threshold is too high for shareholders in JSLCs. A report issued by the China 
Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation in 2012 indicated that 52.27 per cent of 
surveyed investors invested less than RMB 100,000 in stocks, and 85.2 per cent of them 
invested less than RMB 500,000.85 This study was continued by the Feng Hua Finance and 
Economic Consulting Firm (丰华财经) for their report in 2013, finding that 45.36 per cent of 
the surveyed investors invested less than RMB 50,000 in stocks and 75.1 per cent invested 
                                            
84 S Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2015); Huang (n 
15 above); J Deng, “Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China” (2005) 46 
Harvard International Law Journal 347; W Cheng, “Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New 
Company Law: 26 Case Studies” (2010) International Journal of Law and Management 283; Z Zhang, 
“Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement Is Actually for 
Nothing” (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 174; Zhao (n 68 above). 
85  A Survey of Securities Investors 2012 (2012 年中国证券投资者综合调查报告 ) p 43, available at 
http://www.sipf.com.cn/images/NewCH/zxdc/2013/03/01/EC3861DC3E3764896A8CB1DC5F4E94C7.pdf (last 
visited on 6th June 2018). 
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less than RMB 500,000.86 More recently, a report published by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
disclosed that 84.4 per cent of the investors had invested less than RMB 500,000.87 Finally, a 
report from the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) 
indicated that 76.73 per cent of the surveyed investors invested less than RMB 100,000 and 
95.15 per cent of them invested less than RMB 500,000.88 Considering the fact that most of 
the listed companies have a market value of RMB 1 billion,89 RMB 500,000 is a long way 
from 1 per cent of the market value. Therefore, the holders of these stocks, more than 84 per 
cent of the shareholders in listed companies based on the data from 2012 to 2015, do not have 
the right to bring a derivative action as an independent claimant under the current company 
law of China. 
Furthermore, based on the shareholding distribution of A-shares 90  held by 
professional institutional shareholders in 2014, the breakdown of the shareholding percentage 
of seven groups of intuitional shareholders, including pension funds, Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors insurance companies, trusts, corporate annuities, securities firms 
(proprietary accounts) and securities firms (asset management schemes) in listed companies 
in China, was 0.61, 1.17 1.71, 3.87, 1.37, 0.14, 0.31 and 0.23 per cent, respectively. It is 
                                            
86  JFINFO, “A Survey of Individual Investors 2013” (2014) p 11, available at 
http://www.jfinfo.com/special/2013report.pdf (last visited on 6th June 2018) . 
87 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, “Annual Individual Shareholders Survey 2017, 2017年个人投资者状况调查报
告”, available at http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/39778315.shtml (last visted on 6th June 2018). 
88 J Coffee and DE Schwartz, “The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evolution and a Proposal for Legislative 
Reform” (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 312. 
89 China Centre for Market Value Management, The A Share Annual Report of China 2012 and 2013 (2012 年
和 2013年中国 A股市值年度报告). 
90 A-shares are denominated in Renminbi; comparatively, B-shares are denominated in foreign currency (US 
dollars in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
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reported by the CSDC that there are 289,900 institutional shareholders investing in 2,839 
listed companies in China.91 On average, more than 100 institutional shareholders, in various 
forms, are investing in an individual listed company. It is also likely that there will be more 
than one institutional shareholder investing in a company that belongs to one of the seven 
international shareholder groups mentioned above. Therefore, the likelihood is that a number 
of institutional shareholders will not qualify as a claimant for bringing derivative action either. 
(d) Empirical Observations 
The authors collected a set of original data in July 2016. This involved investigating the 
eligibility of the top 10 biggest shareholders from a sample of 800 listed companies in China 
in terms of bringing a derivative action.92 The samples consist of 400 listed companies on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 400 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This empirical research 
was carried out using purposive sampling, with controls placed on the types of companies 
chosen for the survey in terms of nature and size, and we specifically looked for 
representative samples to make sure that the sample is correctly balanced. We identified the 
key index factors for JSLCs in terms of their key characteristics. As detailed below, we 
selected these samples on the basis of the following criteria: was it an SIE or not; the number 
of shareholders; total capitalisation; and industrial classification. The aim was to deliver a set 
of legitimate and comprehensive data that genuinely reflect the pattern of listed companies in 
China and lay a solid base for research on the shareholding percentage of the top 10 
                                            
91 China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, “CSDC Monthly Report” (February 2016) p 
2, available at http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/editor_file/20160314173907448.pdf (last visited on 6th June 
2018). 
92  The data were collected from 15 to 22 June 2016 and reflected the shareholding structures of sample 
companies as of these dates. 
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shareholders.93 The top 10 shareholders were selected because the publicly available data on 
shareholding percentage were limited to this information. 
The sample of 800 selected companies was composed of 396 listed SIEs and 404 
listed non-SIEs (Figure 1), aiming to deliver a balanced view of the unique shareholding 
structure of SIEs in China and its implications for derivative action. As JSLCs in China 
consist of SIEs and non-SIEs, the selection of data is important for our research on the 
importance of derivative actions in both SIEs and non-SIEs in China, and the distinct position 
of non-SIEs in the corporate governance transformation to a more economic and market-
oriented model. Figure 1 aims to show a clear and balanced view of the unique shareholding 
structure of SIEs in China and its implications for derivative action. The figure works well 
with Figures 2–5 to demonstrate that the sample selection method is convincing and coherent. 
Figure 1: Balance of SIE and Non-SIE Listed Companies from the Sample of 800 
Listed Companies 
                                            
93  This sample-selection methodology is preferred instead of investigating all listed companies as: (1) the 
massive number of listed companies adds to the pragmatic difficulty of a thorough investigation; (2) the 
shareholding structure, the number of shareholders and the number of listed companies constantly change with 
time; and (3) a random selection of samples would not reflect the industry attributes of listed companies and 
might lead to biased results on shareholding structures that are heavily influenced by the industries the 
companies engage in. 
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Second, the sample involves companies which are representative of the target 
companies, namely JSLCs, in terms of the number of shareholders and total share capital. In 
other words, the distribution of the number of the companies based on different industrial 
classifications should match those of the entire target population. These two aspects are 
investigated in order to ensure that the poll represents a balanced and representative sample. 
As for the former, the distribution of the number of shareholders in the sample of 800 listed 
companies collected by the authors, as demonstrated in Figure 2, is consistent with the 
distribution of all listed companies in terms of shareholder numbers, based on data collected 
by EastMoney (东方财富) on 30 June 201694 regarding the number of shareholders in listed 
companies in China. As for the latter, the pattern of the total share capital collected and 
organised by the authors, demonstrated in Figure 3, is also consistent with the pattern based 
                                            
94 Obviously, the authors are aware that there are limitations to this matching exercise since there is a small 
timescale gap here, available at http://data.eastmoney.com/cmjzd/ (visited 11 August 2016). 
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on the data for the total capitalisation of listed companies collected and produced by Hexun 
Data (和讯数据).95 
Figure 2: The Number of Shareholders in the Sample of 800 Listed Companies 
 
Figure 3: The Number of Companies Based on Different Shareholder Capital Ranges 
                                            
95 See http://datainfo.stock.hexun.com/ssgs/jbsj/gbfb.aspx (visited 11 August 2016). 
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Third, these samples, including both SIEs and non-SIEs, cover all industries with listed 
companies, including manufacturing, information technology and software, construction, 
scientific research and technical services, wholesale and retailing, transport warehousing and 
postal industries, mining, financial industry, education, electricity, heat, gas and water 
protection and supply and water conservation, environmental and public facilities 
management (Figures 4 and 5). The percentages of the sample companies in each industry are 
roughly consistent with the pattern of industry classification published by the National 
Equities Exchange and Quotations listed companies in the CSRC annual report.96 We aimed 
to select a sample of 800 companies from all relevant types of industries to enhance the 
representativeness of our sample of all listed companies in a fair manner. 
Figure 4: Industrial Classifications of Non-SIEs 
                                            
96 2014 Annual Report (n 21 above) p 13. 
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Figure 5: Industrial Classifications of SIEs 
 
The hypothesis was that if the current shareholding threshold prescribed in CCL does 
not hinder the use of the derivative action mechanism by minority shareholders in listed 
companies, which we assume have a dispersed ownership structure, the top 10 shareholders, 
or at least the majority of them, should not be barred by the shareholding threshold from 
bringing derivative actions due to their shareholding percentage.97 A few questions were 
raised in order to investigate the soundness of the hypothesis, as well as the possibility of law 
reform: how many shareholders among the top 10 are entitled to bring derivative action, if 
they were to bring a lawsuit on their own? What is the average percentage shareholding? 
What if the percentage requirement were to be lowered to 0.5 per cent? What if the 
percentage requirement was lowered to 0.1 per cent? 
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The result of this quantitative research informs us that on average (as demonstrated in 
Figure 6), 52.10 per cent of the shareholders could bring a derivative action if the standing 
requirement was 1 per cent, 75.44 per cent if the standing requirement was 0.5 per cent and 
99.44 per cent if the standing requirement was 0.1 per cent.98 Drawing from this empirical 
study, it is logical to propose a lower shareholding percentage requirement for listed 
companies, to enable more minority shareholders to use the derivative action regime to 
protect their interests. More user-friendly eligibility criteria could significantly improve the 
enforcement of company law and thus contribute to good corporate governance.99 
Figure 6: The Percentage of Top 10 Shareholders’ Eligibility to Bring a Derivative Action 
and Different Standing Recruitments in Company Law 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
97 Data on the top 10 shareholders’ shareholding percentage is on file and available on request. 
98 Data available on request. 
99 Feinerman (n 70 above) pp 600–601. 
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(e) Difficulties in Collective Action 
Some might argue that it is possible for two or more shareholders to bring a derivative action 
in a collective manner, since the law does allow “shareholders that hold an aggregate 1% or 
more” to bring such derivative actions.100 However, it is not practically feasible to call for 
collective action among shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed ones, at least in China, 
where most minority shareholders are individual shareholders.101 Organising a number of 
individual shareholders who are willing to bring a collective derivative action can be a very 
difficult process. In principle, individual shareholders of listed companies who propose to 
commence or intervene in a lawsuit may consult the central securities registry and the 
clearance agency to obtain details of other shareholders who may want to bring this litigation 
jointly. However, in practice it is very hard for them to acquire contact information because 
of privacy considerations. As a result, these shareholders almost invariably rely on the “last 
resort” of soliciting other shareholders publicly, which will damage the confidence of public 
investors in the company and could affect the reputation of the company.102 Information 
asymmetry has proved in practice to be a major obstacle for joint derivative action claimants, 
who need to acquire sufficient information about their fellow shareholders. Therefore, it is 
clear that joint litigation is either impractical or harmful (or at least very difficult), which is 
against the purpose of the derivative action mechanism to protect the interests of the company. 
                                            
100 Article 151 of the CCL 2013. 
101 FX Hong and SH Goo, “Derivative Action in China: Problems and Prospectus” [2009] Journal of Business 
Law 376, 388. 
102 Liu (n 34 above) p 119; this also happens in cases in which shareholders try to protect themselves through 
direct litigation; see, for example, Xiuning Zhongjing Huadong Nonferrous Investment Co., Ltd. v. Zhang Yue 
Ning et al. (Nanjing Intermediate Court, 2014 No. 920); Jilin International Machinery Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 
v. Wang Xiansheng company (Changchun Chaoyang District Court, 2016 No. 2488); Zhang Ding v. Zhang 
Yong (Jinan Intermediate Court, 2016 No. 5133) 
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(f) Proposals for Changes and Difficulties in Transplanting Common Law Principles: UK 
Law as an Example 
In light of the above-stated difficulties, Zhu and Chen proposed a legislative change, 
intending to replace the current shareholding percentage threshold with a share sum 
requirement with a focus on the value of the shares.103 Presumably, the value of the shares 
here refers to market value rather than nominal value, an arbitrary figure bearing no relevance 
to the business reality. However, the fact that the market value of the shares floats with the 
market is likely to bring a lot of uncertainties and difficulties in enforcement, should this 
proposal be adopted. No alternative suggestion has yet been offered to address this potentially 
serious matter. 
From a practical point of view, it is noted by Zhang, for instance, that a 1 per cent 
shareholding is a “substantial figure” in listed companies, and in China this figure is reached 
mostly by big block-holders,104  many of whom are -state-controlled entities which were 
brought into corporate shareholding structures during the period of restructuring traditional 
state-owned enterprises for listing, and are in a strong rather than vulnerable position in 
comparison to directors, who are often appointed by government entities. 105  In order to 
address the concern that the shareholding percentage requirement may be a hurdle for 
shareholders in JSLCs, some scholars have suggested that China should follow the common 
law route and abolish the shareholding percentage requirement, claiming that any fixed 
minimum percentage or monetary value of shareholding is arbitrary, as the quantity of 
                                            
103 HC Zhu and GQ Chen, “China Introduces Statutory Derivative Action” International Financial Law Review 
(1 July 2005), available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984802/China-introduces-statutory-derivative-
action.html (last visited on 6th June 2018). 
104 Zhang (n 84 above) p 194. 
105 Ibid. 
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ownership does not reflect the potential ability of minority shareholders to make valid and 
legitimate decisions and judgments.106 
Derivative action in most common law jurisdictions is provided for in codified 
statutes. The courts’ decisions to grant applications are always decisions made according to 
statutory criteria. Criteria need to be met before the court can authorise the initiation of a 
derivative action. Taking the United Kingdom as an example, derivative claims were 
delivered at common law for years until a statutory derivative proceedings scheme was 
introduced in the Companies Act 2006, following the approach extant in many 
Commonwealth countries107 in order to promote simplification and modernisation of the law 
to improve its accessibility. 108  Keay argued that the primary characteristic of statutory 
shareholder derivative action is that the “courts are required to perform a gatekeeper role in 
order to exclude frivolous or unmeritorious cases”.109 Permission can be only granted if the 
shareholders who propose to bring a derivative action pass two stages successfully. These 
two stages are designed to enable the court to make decisions in an efficient manner about 
whether to give permission to proceed with the action in the absence of involvement from the 
company.110 First, they have to establish a prima facie case on merit.111 This stage of the 
permission process is designed to assess whether the company and the respondent should be 
put to the expense and inconvenience of considering and contesting the application for 
                                            
106 The “rationale underpinning the minimum shareholding strategy is flawed”, Zhang (n 84 above) p 197. 
107 Such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. 
108 Shareholder Remedies (n 1 above) p 7 and para 6.4. 
109 Keay (n 83 above) p 40. 
110 These first two have been merged by the courts in some cases, such as Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 
(Ch); Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072. 
111 Section 261(2) of the Companies Act 2006; see also Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), 
[2011] 1 BCLC 498, [2010] BCC 420. 
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permission.112 The court will therefore filter out cases that stand little or no chance of success 
and dismiss frivolous claim without company involvement at the earliest possible 
opportunity.113 
If this stage proves successful, the case may proceed towards a second stage.114 Here, 
the court must decide whether to grant permission by taking into account three criteria listed 
in s 263(2), including, for example, whether “a person acting in accordance with Section 172 
(duty to promote the success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim”.115 
Although no discretion should be given to the courts at this point, the court subsequently has 
discretion to decide whether to allow the claim to proceed if none of the criteria in s 263(2) 
apply. In the process of exercising this discretion, the court must take into account factors 
that are embedded in s 263(3) and 263(4).116 
The court as the “gate keeper” and the discretion vested in the court regarding 
whether or not to proceed are seen as central issues under the new statutory procedures. 
However, we do have reservations in adopting this two-staged threshold in China, based on 
the following four reasons. First, commentators do not completely agree about the 
effectiveness of this approach. The criterion that the applicant has to act in good faith in 
                                            
112 Langley Ward Ltd v Trevor [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch), [62]. 
113 HL Deb 9 May 2006, vol 681, col 883 (Lord Goldsmith). 
114 A Keay and J Loughrey, “Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World for Company Management and 
Shareholders” [2010] Journal of Business Law 151. 
115 Section 261(2) of the Companies Act 2006. 
116 Davies and Worthington, however, think that this is a third stage, where a number of factors are laid down 
which the court must take into account in deciding whether to give permission, such as whether the shareholder 
seeking to bring the claim is acting in good faith, possibilities of ratification and the likelihood of company 
pursuing the claim. See ss 263(3) and 268(2) of the Companies Act 2006; PL Davies and S Worthington, 
Gower: Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed., 2016) pp 601–602. 
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bringing a derivative claim,117 for example, is criticised as “uncertain and unworkable”.118 It 
is argued that the court needs to decide whether the benefit from a proposed litigation would 
be outweighed by the harm that it would potentially cause to the company, without full 
evidence verified by cross-examination.119 The transplant should therefore be subject to more 
rigorous assessment of its fitness with comprehensive consideration of other path dependence 
factors, including a number of issues such as overburdened court systems, limited judicial 
resources, judges’ skills and knowledge,120 the limited knowledge of shareholders as natural 
persons and information asymmetries between minority shareholders and institutional 
shareholders.121 As a matter of fact, only 56 per cent of Chinese judges hold degrees,122 and 
many civil servants who are described as judges work in administrative roles.123 
                                            
117 Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072; [2010] BCC 387; s 263 (3) of the 
Companies Act 2006. 
118 A Reisberg, “Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Action in English Law: The Representative Problem” 
(2006) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 69, 101 and 103. 
119 Contribution of Zhang Zhong quoted in J Loughrey, “Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation: The 
Practical Perspective” in J Loughrey (ed), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Ligation in the Wake of the 
Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) pp 229, 245. 
120 T Gong, “Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China” 
(2004) 4 China Review 33; W Gu, “The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis 
Chinese Courts?” (2013) 1 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 303. 
121 It is worth pointing out that among the 126 reported cases found through Bei Da Fa Bao, most are still 
brought by shareholders as natural persons, with only 19 cases involving company/institutional shareholders as 
claimants bringing derivative actions (“representative action” was the term used in the judgments), which are as 
follows: Zhoushan City Civil Aviation Development Co, Ltd v Wang Yaqing (2010 ZhouPuShan No 385); 
Hunan Xianchu Interactive Media Company Ltd v Hu Jia (2013 Chao MinChuZi No 02014); Pingdingshan 
Blasting Equipment Franchise Co v Mao Zhenzhong (2013 Zhan MinYiChuZi No 212); Shandong Kangyuan 
Biological Breeding Ltd v Pan Gang (2014 HuiShangChuZi No 234); Shaanxi Institute of Experimental 
Medicine Pharmaceutical v Li (2013 XianqinMinChuZi No 03451); Pinghai Development Co, Ltd v Shanghai 
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Second, the prima facie test has been made familiar by lawyers in the United 
Kingdom and some other common law countries and was seen as the primary test in 
applications for interim injunctions in most cases during the 20th century.124 However, the 
test is not widely known and applied in China in relation to company law. 
Third, the codified restatement of directors’ duties, which reflect common law and 
equitable principles, is key for the understanding and enforcement of directive action in the 
                                                                                                                                       
Star Group Zhen City Real Estate Co, Ltd (2005 HuGaoMingsiShangChuZi 1; this case was concluded on 30 
September 2007 and Company Law 2006 was applied); Ningbo Yinzhou Xin’an Printing Co, Ltd v WeiDong Lu 
(Su ZhongShangWaiChuZi No 0021); UNISON Electro Dynamics (FAAF) LLC v B Co, Ltd (2011 Hu 
YiZhongMinSiShangChuZi No S59); Yiwu Harvest Investment Advisory Co, Ltd v Zhejiang NiuTouNgau Tau 
Style Ltd (2012 ZheJinShangChuZi No 32); World Leader Development Co, Ltd v Zhongcheng Lin (2013 
QuanMinChuZi No 939); Nantong Hengxiang Co Ltd v XiangshuiHengxiang Co, Ltd (2014 Su ShangZhongZi 
No 0012); Siyang County TaHui Textile Co, Ltd v Jianfen Yu (2013 Su ShangChuZi No 0140); Pumuyuan Co, 
Ltd v Shanghai Fusheng Bean Products Co, Ltd (2014 MinTiZi 170); Chongqing Li Hao Development Co, Ltd v 
Jun Guo (2011 Yu WuZhongFaMinZhongZi No 3948); Beijing YiJinYuHui Technology Investment Ltd v Shen 
Wang (2012 YiZhong Min ZhongZi 1751); Xinjiang Wujiaqu Xinbao Agricultural Science and Technology 
Development Co, Ltd v HeJing County Hope Investment (Group) Co, Ltd (2015 Xin MinErZhongZi No 29); 
Nantong East River Real Estate Development Co v Yangzhou TongJi Real Estate Development Co (2014 Su 
ShangZhongZi 00491); and Shanghai Huayuan Health Venture Capital Co, Ltd v Sheng Qiu Cheng (2014 Hu 
ErZhongMinSiShangZhongZi S543). 
122 Jingwen Zhu (ed), China Legal Development Report 中国法律发展报告：数据库和指标体系 (Beijing: 
Renmin University Press, 2007) p 34. 
123 The Economist, Legal Reform: Judging Judges (24 September 2015) available at 
https://www.economist.com/china/2015/09/24/judging-judges (last visited on 6th June 2018). 
124 Hoffman-La Roche (F) & Co v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [1975] AC 295, 338 and 380; see also 
C Gray, “Interlocutory Injunctions since Cyanamid” (1981) 40 Cambridge Law Journal 307; P Carlson, 
“Granting an Interlocutory Injunction: What Is the Test” (1982–1983) 12 Manitoba Law Journal 109. 
44 
 
United Kingdom and other common law countries.125 It is indeed the fact that the concept of 
fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, is explicitly stipulated in 
CCL,126 with codification of a number of misconducts in terms of the violation of duties by 
directors.127 However, the successful application and enforcement of the approach is heavily 
dependent on judicial discretion about when this inclusive and flexible principle may be 
applied to individual cases, so the nature and scope of the duty may be constantly refined and 
enriched by precedential ruling by judges.128 This makes it problematic to transplant this 
common law approach to jurisdictions with a civil law background, with difficulties in 
making the principle a workable one in judicial practice.129  This is demonstrated by the 
empirical research of Xu et al and historical evidence from Japanese transplantation.130 
Fourth, the use of derivative action in the United Kingdom also depends on its 
relationship with the remedy of unfair prejudice, embedded in s 994 of the Companies Act 
2006 without court authorisation. The notion of “unfair prejudice” does not have an 
equivalent in CCL in terms of shareholder rights in bringing a lawsuit.131 
The imposition of a fixed and lowered threshold figure for listed companies seems 
necessary at least at the current time in China, for its effect in avoiding excessive litigations 
                                            
125 S Watkins, “The Common Law Derivative Action: An Outmoded Relic” (1999) 30 Cambrian Law Review 
40; JL Yap, “Whither the Common Law Derivative Action” (2009) 38 Common Law World Review 197. 
126 CCL 2013 art 147. 
127 Ibid., art 148. 
128 Xu et al (n 66 above) p 87. 
129 Ibid. 
130 The loyalty duty has not been applied separate by Japanese courts; see H Kanda and CJ Milhaupt, “Re-
examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law” (2003) 51 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 887. 
131 Siems (n 80 above) p 101. 
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or malicious lawsuits. Given that the above-discussed empirical study results indicate that a 
modification from a 1 per cent threshold to a 0.1 per cent threshold would render roughly 99 
per cent of the top 10 shareholders in listed companies (ranked in terms of their shareholding 
percentage) eligible to bring derivative actions, the authors suggest lowering the current 
shareholding requirement to at least 0.1 per cent of the total shareholding of the company, to 
enable an adequate number of minority shareholders in listed companies to use the 
mechanism to protect their interests, to use their collective powers in the company’s best 
interests and, most importantly, to mitigate the potential risk of frivolous lawsuits. 
(g) 0.1 Per cent Proposal and the Balance between Voices and Exits 
Another legitimate question that needs addressing is whether a shareholder who owns 0.1 per 
cent of the company share in a JSLC would have incentive to sue in the interests of the 
company in his own name. It is crucial to point out that even under the proposed new 
threshold of 0.1 per cent of shareholding, those shareholders who are eligible in JSLCs are 
not small shareholders or minority shareholders. Based on our empirical data, 7.65 per cent of 
the top 10 shareholders fall within the shareholding percentage range of 0.1–0.2 per cent. As 
we mentioned earlier, the CSDC concluded that 76.73 per cent of the surveyed investors had 
invested less than RMB 100,000. It would be difficult to imagine that these shareholders 
would have incentives to bring a derivative action. However, considering the 91 million gu 
min (data from July 2015), it is highly unlikely that these shareholders would fall in the 
category suggested by us based on a threshold shareholding percentage of 0.1 per cent. 
Moreover, regarding individual shareholders, only a small portion of shares in listed 
companies are held by them, with average ownership equalling 2.38 per cent for all 
individual shareholders, and it is very unlikely that they will hold 0.1 per cent of the shares in 
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any company. 132  We are convinced that shareholders(s) who own(s) 0.1 per cent have 
sufficient self-interests in the outcome of litigation to conduct a truly adversarial lawsuit. 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify the rationale for giving adequate standing to 
members while dissatisfied shareholders in a listed company could use the “exit strategy” by 
leaving the company. It is clear that derivative actions may entail possible benefits in two 
ways. First, Reisberg summarised two main purposes of derivative action, including 
deterrence of mismanagement and compensating the company and its shareholders for harm 
caused.133 The recovery involved ex post liability and it may only be made after the derivative 
action is brought. Therefore, despite the fact that the shareholders could choose to sell their 
shares, the damage has taken place and the interests of the company and the shareholders 
have been harmed, and they are entitled to the financial benefit of compensation. Lin argued 
that the selling of shares in this scenario does not mean that they are not affected by the 
alleged wrongdoing, since the value of shares may have been affected by this wrongdoing 
and thus the value of the shares, as the property of the shareholders, has reduced.134 Selling 
the shares, in this sense, would lead to immediate loss without having their voice heard for 
remedy and compensation. 
Second, as the “shareholder engagement”, “long-term economic interests” and “long-
term investment culture” have been emphasised post-financial crisis 2008,135  it may not 
                                            
132 OECD Survey (n 31 above), p 5. 
133 Reisberg (n 68 above) p 51. 
134 S Lin, “A New Perspective on China’s Derivative Actions: Who Is Best Suited to Assessing Derivative 
Actions?” (2016) 27 International Company and Commercial Law Review 1, 3. 
135 See, for example, Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012); Association of 
British Insurers, Improving Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement; The Investment Association, 
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always be rational to use an “exit strategy” as an option. Despite the fact that it is difficult to 
find an optional mix of exit and voice, Hirschman famously argued that “exit” and “voice” 
work best together, and voice plays a crucial role in understanding how organisations actually 
work.136 This may also apply to shareholders when they are faced with the option of getting 
their voice heard by bringing derivative actions when they perceive that firms are 
demonstrating a decrease in quality, or such actions would benefit the company (and their 
members). 
(h) Accessibility and Incentives for Institutional Investors to Bring Derivative Actions 
Existing research has supported the argument that altering the shareholding threshold will 
likely improve the accessibility of the derivative action mechanism for shareholders, which is 
the major legislative aim of Chinese law drafters. 137  Therefore, a proposal for a lower 
threshold in relation to the shareholding percentage and period will be made to make 
derivative action in China more effective and to ensure that the regime is utilised more 
systematically in JSLCs instead of being mere window-dressing. Moreover, since China has 
chosen to adopt a statutory derivative action mechanism in current legislation, it is necessary 
for the mechanism to be user-friendly for shareholders who are genuinely willing to initiate 
                                                                                                                                       
Supporting UK Productivity with Long-Term Investment: The Investment Association’s Productivity Action 
Plan (March 2016); New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance (2010). 
136 AO Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organization and State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); see also J Fox, “Exit, Voice, and Albert O Hirschman” Harvard 
Business Review (12 December 2012). 
137 Huang (n 25 above); Lin (n 84 above). 
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law suits on behalf of companies. It is particularly relevant for institutional shareholders in 
China with strong motivation to engage in corporate governance.138 
Compared with countries with mature financial markets, it may seem worrying that 
institutional shareholders in China have demonstrated a less active level of involvement in 
corporate governance139 to promote private enforcement. It is undeniable that there are means 
other than derivative action for institutional shareholders to monitor and evaluate directors’ 
performance, ranging from the threat of diverting their shares to the active use of their voting 
power in board elections and proxy contest.140 They are becoming increasingly active in 
governing their portfolio companies;141 this is particularly the case for securities investment 
funds. In particular, the existing literature seems to suggest that in general they prefer behind-
the-scenes private engagements such as voting; 142  presenting proposals at shareholders’ 
meetings and ongoing dialogues in public, activist engagements and courtroom 
                                            
138 Jiang and Kim (n 57 above); B Gong, Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative 
Study of the UK and China (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Z Chen, B Ke and Z Yang, “Minority Shareholders’ 
Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural 
Experiment from China” (2013) 88 The Accounting Review 1211. 
139  B Gong, “The Limits of Institutional Shareholder Activism in China and the United Kingdom: Some 
Comparisons” in R Tomasic (ed), Routledge Handbook of Corporate Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 
140  W Wu, SA Johan and OM Rui, “Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of 
Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud” (2016) 134 Journal of Business Ethics 709, 712. 
141 C Xi, “Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice (Part 1)” (2006) 17 International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 251. 
142 Y Zeng, Q Yuan and J Zhang, “Dark Side of Institutional Shareholder Activism in Emerging Markets: 
Evidence from China’s Split Share Structure Reform” (2011) 40 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 240, 
259. 
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confrontations are regarded as the very last resort.143  Our empirical research specifically 
identified some characters of institutional investors’ derivative action. As discussed above, 
since the implementation of the CCL 2005, 126 cases have been accepted by the People’s 
Court when shareholder(s) brought derivative actions either individually or collectively. 
Among these derivative action cases we identified, there were 19 in which institutional 
shareholders acted as claimants.144 We further found that only 5 out of these 19 cases were 
allowed (including those that were fully or partly accepted), while the rest were rejected due 
to reasons such as shareholders failing to make a request to the supervisors first (Hunan 
Xianchu, Nantong Hengxiang, UNISON and Pumuyuan), alleging both direct action and 
derivative action in one case (Chongqing Li Hao), claimants with conflicts of interests (Yiwu 
Harvest, Pumuyuan and UNISON), directors acting within the authorisation specified by the 
articles of association (Yiwu Harvest and Siyang), directors fulfilling their duty of care 
(Siyang) or failing to prove damages (Pinghai and Nantong East River). The status of 
derivative actions in China litigated by institutional shareholders is dominated in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Status of Institutional Investors’ Derivative Action 
                                            
143 Xi (n 141 above) p 253; see also S Estrin and M Prevezer, “The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate 
Governance: Brazil, Russia, India, and China Compared” (2011) 28 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 41. 
144 We identified 19 cases involving company/institutional shareholders as claimants bringing derivative actions 
(“representative action” was the term used in the judgments). See note 121 for the 19 cases. 
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Looking at the causes of these 19 actions, they include matters such as appropriating the 
company’s funds (Hunan Xianchu, Nantong Hengxiang, Nantong East River, Beijing YiJin 
and UNISON), taking loans from the company (Xinjiang Wujiaqu Xinbao, Shanxi 
Pharmaceutical), exclusion from management (UNISON and Nantong Hengxiang), taking 
over the company stamp or financial accounts (Chongqing Li Hao, Nantong Hengxiang and 
Shanghai Huayuan), failing to pay capital contributions (Pinghai and Pumuyuan), failing to 
fulfil obligations under the shareholders’ agreement (Zhoushan Aviation), undervalued 
transfers (Siyang) and unfair competition (Beijing YiJin). It is worth highlighting that most 
actions (with three exceptions) aimed to settle a deadlock between two shareholders or two 
“camps” of shareholders, and the actions were usually brought by minority shareholders 
against majority shareholders or directors appointed by majority shareholders.145 
                                            
145 One case was filed by the majority against a minority shareholder, where the majority was a foreign investor 
excluded from the management (UNISON); one case was filed by the majority shareholder against the director 
(Siyang), and the other case was filed by the supervisory board against the directors who allegedly have 
competed with the company and diverted the company’s funds (Beijing YiJin). 
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It may also be observed that the derivative action mechanism has not been widely 
used for institutional shareholders to bring lawsuits against directors, supervisors or senior 
officers. The cases have all happened in LLCs where no shareholding period and percentage 
threshold are required. 
The lack of cases and incentives for institutional shareholders to initiate derivative 
proceedings may be the result of various intuitional, legal and reputational constraints. For 
instance, constraints may rest on traditional Chinese culture, which did not encourage 
litigations, since the strongly and deeply rooted system of conventional Confucian ethics 
declared that “the most important thing was to avoid litigation” for the cultivation of personal 
virtue in promoting good and humane governance. 146  The reluctance of institutional 
shareholders to intervene may also be partly attributable to the regulatory threshold, with 
shareholding percentages and periods required for eligibility to bring derivative actions, as 
well as other legal constraints. Another important issue relates to the incentives for initiating 
such actions and the potential reputation costs related to this litigation. In the following 
section, we will address why derivative action should be further developed and encouraged 
on Chinese soil despite the existence of these constraints. 
The first institutional constraint may rest on the belief that cultural values deeply 
affect the choices of dispute resolution means in Chinese society. 147  The Confucian 
injunction to maintain long-term relationships between people and harmony with others may 
discourage litigations, with the law used as a vehicle for promulgating policies for the 
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common good rather than resolving disputes among private parties. 148  Following this 
philosophy may undermine the use of shareholder litigation, like other litigations, to avoid 
conflicts and maintain Confucian virtues. Instead, the mediation of disputes would be 
encouraged. 
However, contemporary arguments in the context of the economic and legal 
framework in China suggest a different trajectory. For example, the legalists believe that a 
nation’s cohesion can be secured by the application of strict legislation, together with harsh 
and legitimate punishment.149 Adopting strict laws has contributed substantially to social 
stability and the settlement of disputes in China.150 With the emergence and development of 
the rule of law in China as a self-sustaining principle in line with the goals for market-led 
economic growth,151  it is no longer unusual to resolve disputes through litigation in the 
current commercial and economic climate. As pointed out by Lin, there is an interaction 
between culture and derivative action, and the commercial culture promoted by Chinese 
recent economic development indicates that shareholders, especially institutional 
shareholders, would not hesitate to bring an action if it is necessary to do so.152 
The second institutional constraint arguably rests on the inability of the 
underdeveloped judiciary system in China to accommodate the increasing volume of 
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litigations. Issues such as overburdened court systems, limited judicial resources and judges’ 
skills and knowledge153 could all be potential worries and obstacles here. In fact, Chinese 
judges still lack experience and knowledge,154 and judicial decisions are not the source of 
law.155 Problems such as this lack of expertise and the absence of case law to help judges 
make decisions make derivative actions in China far from useful, compared with ordinary 
suits. These factors may discourage shareholders from bringing derivative actions. 
While acknowledging the judicial difficulties, it is also worth pointing out that China 
has been making considerable strides in building a more competent and professional judiciary 
with the enactment of Judge Law and the rigorous National Bar Exam156 to gather the most 
talented people (rencai) for the legal profession.157 Many improvements have been made 
including diminished local protectionism, increased professionalism and the improved 
enforcement of commercial cases, due to multiple factors such as the increasingly diversified 
economy, streamlined court procedures, the improved judicial system and adequate 
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funding.158 These positive aspects may encourage qualified shareholders in JSLCs to bring 
actions, giving them more confidence in the fairness of judgments and the efficiency of 
enforcement measures. If there is an increased number of derivative actions as the result of 
the proposed more relaxed “unnecessary”159 threshold in this article, it may be confidently 
claimed that “there are sufficient judicial resources to deal with this increase in shareholder 
litigation”, partly indicated by a healthy and comparatively higher ratio of one judge to every 
48,000 people. 160  The attitude of the Chinese courts towards shareholder litigation has 
become increasingly friendly towards shareholders since the Supreme People’s Court issued 
its Second Circular to lift the restriction on accepting cases in 2002.161 
Additionally, the guiding case system was introduced as a novel attempt to benefit 
from the advantages of both the common law and civil systems. The Supreme People’s Court 
of China has converted 92 judicial opinions into what are intended to be de facto binding 
decisions, which local courts at all levels may refer to when making decisions on similar 
cases since January 2012.162 This will potentially bring benefits by enhancing faith in the 
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judiciary in China. 163  Although no cases have been converted to authoritative judicial 
opinions concerning derivative action, partly due to the shortage of cases involving JSLCs as 
the result of the high threshold and litigation fee, Chinese judges are practically accustomed 
to search similar cases reported in Bei Da Fa Bao and “China Judgements Online”164 for 
reference before making judgments, which has been helpful in terms of ensuring judicial 
consistency in China. 
One of the biggest legal constraints for shareholders, including institutional 
shareholders, in bringing derivative actions is the litigation fee.165 The legislative legal basis 
of the costs of derivative action in China rests on Civil Procedure Law 1992, Measures for 
the Administration of Attorneys’ Fee 2006. The usual rule is that the losing party will be 
ordered by the court to pay the winning party’s “case acceptance fee”, the fee charged by the 
court that tries the case, while each party pays its own attorney’s fees and other expenses.166 
From September 2017, in order to make sure that litigation costs are tailored to a level that 
does not further discourage shareholders from bringing these actions so that the scheme can 
“reach its full potential”,167 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about 
the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China IV (Provision IV) 
were introduced to address the question of whether the claimant shareholder may be 
reimbursed for their expenses. It is stipulated that the courts should support the indemnity 
                                            
163 R Li, “Case-Law Adopted by China?” (UK Constitutional Law Associations, 26 January 2012), available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/26/ruiyi-li-case-law-adopted-by-china/ (last visited on 6th June 2018). 
164 China Judgements Online (中国裁判文书网), available at http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/(last visited on 6th 
June 2018). This is based upon unreported interviews with three judges in City X. 
165 Zhao (n 68 above) p 243. 
166 Article 29 of the Measure on Payment of Litigation 诉讼费用交纳办法 2007. 
167 Huang (n 15 above) p 248. 
56 
 
claims of shareholders who successfully bring a lawsuit on behalf of a company, allowing 
them to claim for attorneys’ fees, investigation fees, assessment fees, notary fees and other 
reasonable costs incurred during the litigation. 168  Since the “dearth of public company 
derivative suits can be mainly attributed to the restrictive standing requirement and the 
prohibitive litigation costs issues”,169  the most significant problem for derivative actions 
among JSLCs would be the shareholding percentage and period threshold if art 26 of 
Provision IV can be effectively enforced in China. Furthermore, Huang made it clear through 
empirical study that the availability of “the risk agency fee has facilitated the bringing of 
securities civil suits and has led to the emergence of many entrepreneurial lawyers in 
China”.170 Referencing experience in the United States,171  the increase and popularity of 
entrepreneurial lawyers may also lead to an increase in derivative action in China with the 
enforcement of Provision IV, leaving the shareholding period and percentage as an 
unnecessary threshold awaiting urgent attention to encourage eligible shareholders to resolve 
disputes through this mechanism. 
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The reputational constraint has also been referred to when discussing the inactivity of 
institutional investors. While private engagement approaches such as voting and resolutions 
normally target the misconduct or performance of the board of directors as a collective body, 
derivative actions involve a “personal attack on specific directors”.172 This may lead to a 
negative impact on the “guanxi” between the attacked directors and the institutional 
shareholders173 and may put companies’ reputations at risk by sending a signal to the public 
that they have been poorly managed. As a result, some argued that intuitional shareholders 
may be cautious about using the derivative action mechanism as an activism strategy.174 
However, one is tempted to argue that this may be an arbitrary conclusion without a 
detailed analysis of the compensation and deterrence functions of derivative action.175 The 
procedural rule of demand surrounding derivative actions has been adopted to strike a 
balance between improving shareholder remedies and preventing vexatious suits, which is 
particularly relevant for public companies.176 Shareholders are not entitled to file a lawsuit 
directly to the court to remedy an alleged harm without first making a written demand to the 
(board of) directors or the (board of) supervisors.177 
When assessing the importance and possibilities of continuing a claim the supervisor, 
the supervisory board, the board of directors or the executive director should consider issues 
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such as the cost of the proceedings and potential damage to the company’s reputation before 
making a decision as to whether to pursue actions in court. In other words, this procedural 
requirement is “a nod to the principle of exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies”, 178 
emphasising that an opportunity should be given to the company before the intervention of 
the Court because the company is the party that has suffered directly. If a company has other 
possible approaches to solve the problem, there is no need to resort to judicial resources if the 
wrong may be corrected by itself; this may also benefit the company.179 The demand rule is 
helpful for companies and their shareholders to make sure that they initially exhaust internal 
remedies. Therefore, concerns for corporate reputation have been mitigated. Considering the 
screening process carried out by the director, the supervisor, the board of directors or the 
supervisory board, who have access to the resources of the company as well as information 
about the directors’ conduct and decisions,180 it is questionable to stipulate the shareholding 
percentage and period requirements at an exorbitantly harsh level. 
Although the fundamental interests of shareholders, especially those of institutional 
shareholders, would be successful and profitable investments rather than becoming mired in 
litigation, it could be argued that shareholders’ incentives to engage in litigation would likely 
increase with the dynamic cultural, judiciary and legal framework transformation in China. 
With clarification of litigation fee-related issues through the Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (IV), the trajectory of the popularity of derivative actions may rise; this 
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was the Japanese experience, another jurisdiction that was also influenced by cultural 
constraints such as Confucian philosophy, with fundamental change starting from the Nikko 
Securities case decisions by the Tokyo High Court. This change in Japan came as an 
unexpected shock,181 and this could also occur in China. 
4. Shareholding Period Requirement 
Apart from the shareholding ownership percentage requirement, shareholders in JSLCs are 
also required to hold their shares for more than 180 consecutive days to be qualified as 
claimants for derivative action.182 This 180-day rule was further clarified by the Supreme 
Court in 2006, stating that “the shareholding period of at least 180 days in succession 
specified in Article 151 of the Company Law shall have elapsed by the time the shareholder(s) 
institute(s) a suit in the people’s court”.183 This means the criteria of shareholder must have 
held one per cent of the shares at the time the action is initiated. The CCL does not require 
that the shareholders bringing the action must have been shareholders at the time the cause of 
action arose, and the US-origin “contemporary ownership rule” 184  was rejected. These 
requirements are very similar to those embedded in the old Japanese Commercial Code.185 
The provision is retained with an additional urgency requirement in the New Japanese 
Commercial Law, as an exception to bring derivative actions in urgent circumstances where 
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failure to bring such a suit immediately could result in irreparable damage to the company’s 
interests.186 CCL transplanted this Japanese approach. Additionally, it is the duty of a party to 
an action to provide evidence in support of his allegations according to Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law.187 Thus, it is the duty of the claimant, namely the shareholder(s), to provide 
that he, she or they have held their shares uninterrupted for 180 consecutive days. This does 
not come as a surprise, given the fact that to a certain extent China’s company law framework 
was modelled on that of its civil law neighbour countries and regions. 
In terms of the function of the shareholding period requirement and its exceptions, 
Hong and Goo hold a double-edged view and describe these as requirements that are “really 
helpful to deter unmeritorious suits given the heavy caseload in Chinese courts” from a 
positive side, but from the negative side they could “cause further loss to the company 
because the plaintiff shareholders have to wait for six months to bring the action without any 
exceptions”.188 They also think this transplant is “disappointing due to the ineffectiveness and 
problems of the Japanese approach”,189 and the equivalent of the six-month shareholding 
period requirement in Japan has been criticised for its arbitrariness.190 
The shareholding period requirement was introduced to avoid malicious litigation and 
unnecessary distractions for directors, supervisors and senior managers in dealing with claims. 
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It will avoid shareholders purchasing shares for the purpose of bringing litigation. It will also 
mitigate the risk that claimants may abuse derivative actions to threaten the plaintiff for 
shareholders’ own personal interests and illegitimate purposes. The emphasis here is on the 
length of the shareholding period, which has advantages in the clarity and convenience in 
application. However, it is a shame that there is no linkage between the shareholding period 
requirement and the timing of the directors’ infringement. This may contradict the purpose of 
imposing a shareholding period requirement in terms of avoiding people buying shares in 
order to bring a suit. Commentators have therefore suggested transplanting the US 
contemporary ownership model in order to remedy this defect.191 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the contemporary ownership rule was 
rejected in the revised CCL enforced in 2006. The reasons for the rejection, according to the 
explanation of the highest court on 10 May 2006, are as follows. First, the complexity of 
corporate misconduct and difficulties in defining the start date of directors’ infringements 
make it very costly for courts to apply the model in practice. Second, the mechanism should 
be compatible with corporations’ institutional development and judicial understanding of the 
derivative action system as shareholder’s remedies with an accumulation of cases. It was 
argued that the underdevelopment of derivative action makes stringent restrictions on such 
actions unnecessary, and a positive attitude should be adopted so that the mechanism may be 
conducted in a way that improves corporate governance and promotes shareholders’ 
awareness of executing their rights.192 However, after 11 years of enforcement, the trajectory 
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of the quantity of cases involving JSLCs is rather disappointing and the application of the 
mechanism in LLCs has built experience in applying and referencing the tool in practice. 
Therefore, this may be a good opportunity to reconsider the feasibility and merits of adopting 
the rule. 
The contemporary ownership model requires that the demanding party was a 
shareholder at the time the cause of action arose. It may function as a more shareholder-
friendly threshold than the 180 uninterrupted days and deals with issues such as 
impracticability and the unreasonable length of time for individual shareholders. The 
requirement could be applied in the courts for the “prevention of strike suits and speculative 
litigation”. 193  On the other hand, the rule has also been criticised 194  for being unfair to 
shareholders who detect directors’ misconduct giving rise to a lawsuit only after becoming 
shareholders.195 However, linking the committing of the alleged wrong to share ownership 
seems to be more shareholder-friendly than the 180-day period, while both mechanisms may 
not only avoid malicious litigation but also ensure that the plaintiff has sufficient self-interest 
in the outcome of the litigation to conduct a truly adversarial proceeding.196 The change is 
consistent with the purpose of removing legal procedural hurdles and building an investor-
friendly and enabling shareholder lawsuit system in order to protect “its numerous 
unsophisticated public investors effectively”.197 
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From a practical point of view, this standard of 180 days, together with thresholds on 
shareholding ownership, may seriously hinder the initiation of derivative suits in JSLCs. The 
duration requirement hinders shareholders from using the mechanism “in time” to stop the 
misconduct of directors and protect the interests of the company. Shareholders have to wait 
until the 180th day before they bring a lawsuit, even if they are convinced that the director 
has breached their duties. Liu discussed the irrationality of the shareholding period 
requirement in a hypothetical scenario. A shareholder purchases shares on the first day and 
detects evidence of the directors’ misbehaviour on the second day.198 Even if the shareholder 
holds more than 1 per cent of the shares, they still need to “wait for” 178 days before they can 
bring a derivative action. During this 178-day period, they may witness additional 
misconducts from the board and reductions in the share price.199 However, what they are able 
to do in response to these misbehaviours is limited to encouraging the supervisory board or 
independent directors to start an investigation, encouraging eligible shareholders to bring 
lawsuits or using mass media to put directors under pressure.200 These approaches are only 
likely to be successful if those shareholders who are not eligible are influential, and the whole 
process can also be rather time-consuming, which may even take longer than 180 days. Lin 
further argued that these appeals may be ignored, and not all shareholders are able to access 
or use the media under such scenarios to put pressure on management.201 
Obviously, arguments of “exit remedies” may also be relevant here. In addition to the 
discussions presented in s 3.7, the exit strategy would not solve the fundamental problems to 
do with shareholders recovering damages and deterring directors from misbehaviour. Besides, 
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some shareholders may simply wish to stay with the company in which they hold shares for a 
number of reasons, such as their belief in the company’s prospects in the long term, and the 
fact that “exit remedies” contradict shareholders’ intentions to invest in good faith, their 
willingness to engage in sustainable investment and their need to have their voices heard by 
challenging wrongdoers in order to hold them accountable. 
In relation to the secondary sources and with reference to recent data, Li argued that 
the consecutive 180-day requirement would constitute a barrier for healthy derivative actions 
due to the quick turnover in China,202 which was demonstrated by Jin’s survey in which the 
average shareholding period in Chinese listed companies is four months.203 Peng claimed that 
180 days is too long for individual shareholders in JSLCs, especially for listed ones, since the 
majority of individual shareholders invest for the profit available by selling their shares rather 
than for claiming dividends.204 She contended that the “harsh” shareholding period threshold 
would not benefit the effectiveness of the derivative action mechanism at its very early stage 
in China.205 It has been reported by the CSRC, taking the survey in 2015 as an example, that 
the average holding period is approximately 44 days for individual shareholders in listed 
                                            
202 X Li, Shareholder’s Derivative Action from the Company Law Perspective: A Comparative Study of 
England, US, Germany and China 公司法视角下的股东代表诉讼: 对英国, 美国, 德国和中国的比较研究 
(Beijing: Law Press, 2009) p 281. 
203 X Jin, Shareholding Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Listed Companies 上市公司股权结构
与公司治理 (Beijing: China Finance Publishing House, 2005). 
204 X Peng, “Study on China’s Shareholder Derivative Action System 我国股东派生诉讼制度研究” (2011) 5 
Hebei Law Science 河北法学 150, 151. 
205 Ibid. 
65 
 
companies.206 Looking at data for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange only, in 2012 the average 
holding period was approximately 39.1 days for individual shareholders in listed 
companies.207 From these two sets of data, the 180-day requirement apparently excludes the 
majority of the individual shareholders in listed companies. Therefore, the 180-day threshold 
creates an artificial barrier for individual shareholders. 
Indeed, for individual shareholders, the investment incentives of a large proportion of 
shareholders have been shown to be short-term and oriented by statistics. These investors, 
who have the goal of immediate returns, are normally ignorant about the details and strategies 
of the companies and vote with their feet. 208  With limited information and insufficient 
incentives, it is extremely unlikely that these short-term trading shareholders would bring a 
derivative lawsuit against boards of directors and challenge their decisions.209 Furthermore, 
the concept of “avoiding litigation” is deeply rooted in people’s minds based on the belief of 
“turning big problems into small ones and small problems into no problems at all”.210 In a 
social relationship like this, people sometimes choose to tolerate problems even if their 
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interests are jeopardised. Therefore, under the current investment and legal environment, it is 
very hard for individual Chinese shareholders to file a lawsuit for the interests of the 
company and other shareholders. Even if they could, there remains the problem of their 
incentives to do so. 
However, even in light of the fact that minority shareholders are unlikely to bring a 
derivative action in China, the legislation itself should not put individual shareholders in an 
even more disadvantaged position by making it hard or impossible for individual 
shareholders to use the tool to question decisions of the board. Individual shareholders 
currently encounter particular difficulties when they seek redress against JSLCs. With limited 
information and incentives, the tool has only been used once in the last 11 years, but scandals 
such as Wanke and Geli demonstrated the strong necessity of shareholder litigation and 
supervision in listed companies in China; this is particularly important for those who are non-
controlling shareholders.211 At the same time, the lack of cases in JSLCs is partly due to the 
availability of information and difficulties in applying shareholder remedy mechanisms such 
as derivative action in practice. Practice suggests that the “burden” of self-regulation, the 
investigatory power of the CSRC and indeed criminal and administrative laws are insufficient 
to cope with fraud or mismanagement that may occur in JSLCs. A logical response here 
would thus be the necessity of proposing changes in the current company law in order to 
make derivative action more accessible for individual shareholders, focusing on less 
demanding shareholding period requirements for JSLCs. 
With the emphasis on shareholder protection, especially on the lack of voice, 
information and bargaining power, derivative action, as a system for shareholder remedy, 
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should be designed in an enabling rather than hindering manner and should give access to 
shareholders who sincerely care about corporate performance and directors’ decisions and 
behaviours. Derivative action is one of the most ingenious accountability mechanisms for 
larger formal organisations, and supervisors and accountees should include shareholders 
beyond powerful and well-informed ones. From the perspective of the sustainable 
development of derivative action in China, Wang argued that the shareholding period 
requirement should be abolished considering its very intermittent usage for shareholders in 
JSLCs after the enforcement of CCL 2005.212 He argued that a shorter or no shareholding 
period threshold would not only allow more shareholders to join the ranks to supervise 
directors but also reaffirm shareholders in their remedies, which is particularly important in 
China with its immature corporate governance and unbalanced structural shareholding 
ownership. 213  Reformers have made some agreements according to which a different 
timeframe should be introduced in listed companies and JSLCs, with three months for 
shareholders in non-listed JSLCs and an even shorter period for listed companies.214 The 
reason for the different treatment rests on the incentives for investment. It is claimed that the 
investment purpose for minority shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed companies, is to 
make a profit through stock market transactions. They tend to stay in the market for shorter 
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periods of time with the purpose of getting an immediate return from their investment. 
Although the authors agree with the reason for shortening the shareholding period 
requirement, the “half price” approach, proposing a three-month period instead of six months, 
seems to be random with little theoretical and empirical support. As discussed above, this 
standard seems to be arbitrary, and it is difficult to set an exact bar for the shareholding 
period. A shorter or abolished shareholding period regimen seems to be the way forward. 
A comparatively new legislative approach in Germany, a civil law country, may give 
us some insightful suggestions, considering that China drafted its corporate law in a hybrid 
manner, employing rules and institutions borrowed from Germany and the United States.215 
The approach adopted in German corporate law in the new s 148 of the AktG in 2005 by the 
Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts in Germany 
sets the threshold for shareholders in JSLCs at only a shareholding percentage or quantity 
requirement for JSLCs (0.1 per cent shareholding percentage in China as proposed in Section 
3), with no requirement in terms of the shareholding period.216 In addition, if the legislators in 
China are convinced of this approach for Chinese JSLCs, the rule that requires the 
shareholders to have held the shares before they learned about the alleged breaches of duty or 
                                                                                                                                       
214 X Wang, “Plaintiff Standing in Shareholder Derivative Actions” (股东代表诉讼的原告资格问题) People’s 
Court Daily (人民法院报) (28 January 2004) p 4; available at http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=4635 
(visited 21 August 2016). 
215  See Wang (n 23 above) p 26; see also MM Siems, “Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and 
Comparative Law” (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 55; Teemu Ruskola, “Conceptualizing Corporations and 
Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective” (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 
1599. 
216 It is required in s 148(1) sentence 1 of AktG that a shareholder or shareholders who together hold 1 per cent 
of the statutory capital or shares with a par value of EUR 100,000 may file a petition for the right to assert the 
claims of the company for damages mentioned in s 147(1) sentence 1 in their own name. 
69 
 
alleged damage from a publication should also be adopted to avoid malicious litigation, as 
justified in Section 4.217 
5. Experiences from Other Jurisdictions 
The imbalance in derivative actions between LLCs and JSLCs in China has not been evident 
in every jurisdiction. Obviously, more well-adjusted figures in other jurisdictions could be 
regarded as the result of multiple factors. Therefore, the figures for derivative actions in 
public companies in other jurisdictions should not be exclusively regarded as the result of an 
absence of or lower shareholding period/percentage. However, considering the sharp 
difference in the figures between LLCs and JSLCs in China, the relatively high shareholding 
percentage requirement may have a causal link with the unpopular application of derivative 
action in JSLCs in China. In this section, factors such as mitigated thresholds through legal 
reforms, litigation costs and court permission as thresholds will be discussed in a few 
jurisdictions’ context to offer the reader a more comprehensive view of the hurdles and 
incentives for initiating derivative actions. It is not feasible and not the theme of the article 
for the authors to illuminate every reason for the comparative popularity of this mechanism in 
other jurisdictions. The mechanism of derivative action is designed, in public companies, to 
work with securities markets, under conditions of media scrutiny and public enforcement to 
protect the interests of companies through the empowerment of shareholder voices.218 If a 
jurisdiction chooses to introduce the mechanism, efforts should be made to make it work 
effectively in both LLCs and JSLCs. 
In Japan, where the shareholding percentage is not a requirement for bringing a 
derivative action, derivative actions involving publicly held companies have been more 
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numerous than those involving closed companies since 1993. 219  It is reported that 119 
derivative actions were brought against listed companies in Japan from 1993 to 2009.220 This 
increase could be the consequence of multiple factors. For instance, the derivative claim cost 
is fixed to be 13,000 Yen for the target of the litigation that does not exceed 1.6 million Yen, 
by deeming derivative actions to be non-property claims.221 Historically, the sliding scale 
system has proven to be a barrier to shareholder derivative claims in Japan.222 In addition to 
the cost issue, the elevated success rate after 1993 (before this date it was very low, with only 
a single case where the plaintiff won) and enhanced awareness of shareholders’ rights are 
also regarded as reasons for the popularity of actions, including actions in public 
companies.223 
In Korea, a shareholder requirement of 0.01 per cent is regarded as “low enough” to 
ensure that derivative suits are feasible.224  It has been reported that over half of the 55 
derivative actions filed in Korea between 1997 and 2010 involved public companies.225 
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In common law countries, directors of public companies may be involved as 
defendants in derivative actions. Provisions for the creation and procedures of statutory 
derivative action have been enacted in these countries. Just as in Japan, many reasons could 
contribute to the number of derivative action cases. In the United States, many cases involve 
public companies, based on the empirical research of Thompson and Thomas.226 Derivative 
actions against listed firms have been regarded as a common issue historically, based on 
research on a sample of 535 public corporations.227 The high percentage of settlement in the 
United States due to the structure of indemnification rights and insurance coverage is another 
reason for the popularity of derivative suits in the United States. Furthermore, derivative 
action in the United States is argued as a lawyer-driven (litigation market-oriented) 
mechanism. They do not normally have any shares in the company, and therefore it is 
irrational to have lawyers initiating actions based on financial incentives.228 The general rule 
in the United States is that each party is responsible for his own attorney’s fees. Irrespective 
of the result of the action, both parties bear their own legal costs under the US Rules of Civil 
Procedure.229 Moreover, the “contingency fee arrangement” is regarded as common practice, 
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where the fees are fixed at a percentage not higher than 30 per cent of the amount of the 
damages claimed as the result of a successful litigation.230 
In the limited evidence from the United Kingdom, three cases, namely 
Bridge,231 Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH232 and BNP Paribas SA v Open 
Joint Stock Company Russian Machines,233 have involved public companies. The 
relatively healthy ratio with public companies may also have a connection with many 
factors, such as litigation costs. The “indemnity order” established that a company 
should indemnify a shareholder defendant in a derivative suit since the shareholder 
acts on behalf of the company and the company is the direct beneficiary, even, in 
fact especially, where the litigation is ultimately unsuccessful. 234  The decision is 
reflected in the Civil Procedure Rule where the court has the power at a permission 
hearing to order the company to indemnify the successful shareholder in relation to 
his costs.235 The cost of a proposed action is regarded, in the United Kingdom, as a 
practical hurdle and a major disincentive to launching a derivative action.236 The Law 
Commission also asserted that the inclusion of the power to provide for an indemnity 
was a significant incentive to shareholders to initiate proceedings.237 In Australia, 4 
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of the 31 concerned companies were publicly held companies during the period from 
March 2000 (the introduction of Pt 2E1A) to 12 August 2005.238 Again, many issues 
could also be involved here, including, for example, the broader range of applicants; 
former members and officers of the company are allowed to bring derivative 
proceedings as well as members.239 
6. Conclusion 
The mechanism of derivative action is one of the most important legal tools, working 
side by side with statutory oppression remedies,240  and it has been a staple of 
corporate law in most common law jurisdictions.241 Overall, the CCL 2005 introduced 
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the derivative regime into China as a notable improvement to the previous version of 
company law, hoping that it would contribute to corporate governance and establish 
an investor-friendly legal and business environment.242 However, this regime is far 
from perfect, and this article attempts to point out its inaccessibility by clarifying 
some thorny issues regarding the eligibility of shareholder claimants. The standing 
requirements applying exclusively to JSLCs are, from our research, a double-edged 
sword as they deter meritorious litigation even as they also prevent vexatious suits. 
The most important element of the standing requirement is to locate an appropriate 
level that makes derivative action effective, applicable and functional. This 
differential treatment was based upon the consideration that the “plight of minority 
shareholders in the limited liability company is generally graver than that of their 
counterparts in the joint stock limited liability company”.243 After all, the derivative 
action scheme was originally introduced to be an effective weapon to deter 
misconduct among management personnel, rather than just being window dressing 
for JSLCs or a useful mechanism for LLCs alone. 
Thus far, the limited use of the mechanism in JSLCs requires us to reconsider the 
sense and appropriateness of this bar on the qualification of a claimant in JSLCs. Analyses 
reveal that most of the derivative lawsuits to date have involved private companies. In the 
meantime, it is hard for shareholders to invoke this action in JSLCs, especially in listed ones. 
While some doubt the willingness of institutional investors to initiate derivative action in 
JSLCs, our analysis has shown that conventional institutional, legal and cultural barriers for 
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institutional investors to actively engage in litigations are diminishing, and their incentives to 
engage in derivative action would likely increase in the future with the dynamic cultural, 
judiciary and legal framework transformation in China. Our empirical analysis further 
discovered that the shareholding percentage threshold imposed by art 151 of CCL 2013 has 
been a big barrier in this regard, pragmatically and problematically excluding a large 
proportion of even the top 10 shareholders. Modifications of the shareholding ownership 
percentage and the shareholding period in China are proposed with the aim of making the 
derivative action mechanism more effective, by making the threshold more rational and 
consistent considering the current securities market structure in China.244 
A proposal of at least 0.1 per cent shareholding percentage and a revised or even 
abolished shareholding period requirement with a contemporary ownership rule is suggested 
in order to make derivative action in China more effective and to ensure that the regime is 
utilised more systematically in JSLCs instead of being mere window dressing. The goals of 
this proposed enlarged provenance of shareholder claimants for derivative action are 
consistent with the initial legislative purpose of imposing thresholds for shareholders in 
JSLCs. The proposed changes to the qualification requirements will entitle and encourage 
more participation from shareholders to challenge and inspect directors’ (mis)conducts and 
decisions, and they will be more likely to be responsible and act in a fiduciary manner.245 As 
a result, the boards are expected to be more accountable to their companies. It is believed that 
these suggested reforms will not only promote the suitability and enabling character of CCL 
but also enhance corporate governance values such as fairness, accountability and 
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effectiveness. The eligibility-related problems identified and discussed in this article are 
timely, important and urgently need to be addressed by legislators in order to make derivative 
actions into a useful and functional mechanism for shareholders in JSLCs. The pragmatic 
impact of lowered thresholds would merit more empirical research, particularly if the reform 
suggestions in this article are adopted by the government. 
Based on other jurisdictions’ experiences and empirical analyses on the situation in 
China, one sees the goal of the proposed reform of derivative action as to maintain a suitable 
balance between improving shareholder remedies and preventing vexatious suits, particularly 
in relation to public companies.246 A rational and balanced threshold (lower than current 
levels, as we will suggest in this article) will deter immoral malfeasance by directors and hold 
them accountable for corporate decisions. A more effective and enabling derivative action 
mechanism will also put less pressure on the CSRC, which uses its regulatory powers to 
facilitate the settling of compensation issues out of court through administrative sanctions.247 
Coupled with proposed changes in law, it might also be helpful to set up a “China’s 
Investor’s Association” to provide investor education and support investor litigation, financed 
by a public fund to ensure its independence and impartiality, so that the shareholders in China 
will be better equipped with knowledge and information concerning how and why to bring 
such actions.248 
 
                                            
246 Huang (n 25 above) p 652. 
247 RH Huang, “Rethinking the Relationship between Public Regulation and Private Litigation: Evidence from 
Securities Class Action in China” (2018) 19 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 333, 353–357. 
248 J Liu, “Improving Investor-Friendly Legal Environment in Chinese Capital Market” in RH Huang and NC 
Howson, Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Law: China and the World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017) pp 162 and 175. 
